Case Summary: In the Matter of the Estate of Charles R. Jones, No. 84SC190 (Colo. Dec. 19, 1985)

Factual and Procedural Background

A testamentary trust established by Charles R. Jones named his daughter as a life estate beneficiary and designated Poudre Valley National Bank of Fort Collins as trustee. After the life beneficiary's death in 1982, William and Harold Alldredge (the petitioners) filed a petition for ascertainment of beneficiaries and a final accounting, asserting interests as survivors and remaindermen in the trust corpus. The Larimer County District Court set the matter for hearing on August 16, 1982, specified the names and addresses of persons named in the trust to whom "copies of all pleadings" were to be sent, and ordered that entries of appearance be filed within 45 days.

The trustee entered an appearance, advocated an interpretation of the trust contrary to the petitioners' interpretation, and the district court adopted the trustee's interpretation after a hearing, denying the petitioners' request for ascertainment and a final accounting. The petitioners' post-judgment motions were denied, and they filed a notice of appeal. Copies of the notice of appeal were sent to parties who had entered appearances but were not sent to other persons named in the trust who had not appeared.

On April 5, 1984, the Colorado Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on the ground that the petitioners failed to give notice of the appeal to each individual named in the district court's August 16, 1982 order (those designated to receive "copies of all pleadings"). The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to review that unpublished court of appeals decision.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the failure to serve notice of appeal upon individuals named in the district court's order (who were not parties and had not entered appearances) required dismissal of the appeal.
Whether C.A.R. 4(a) or other appellate rules required service of a notice of appeal on persons designated in the trial court's order as recipients of "copies of all pleadings."
Whether the district court's directive that "copies of all pleadings" be sent to named persons encompassed service of a notice of appeal.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Rasmussen v. Freehling, 159 Colo. 414, 412 P.2d 217 (1966)	Support for the characterization of "pleadings" as formal allegations in a case (cited with C.R.C.P. 7(a)).	The court cited Rasmussen to support its view that "pleadings" are intended to give notice of matters to be expected at trial and thus did not include the notice of appeal.
Widener v. District Court, 200 Colo. 398, 615 P.2d 33 (1980)	Explains that the notice of appeal is intended to apprise parties of the pendency of an appeal and identify the trial court action being appealed.	The court relied on Widener for the proposition that the notice of appeal's function is to notify parties of the appeal's pendency, distinguishing that function from the service of pleadings.
Hull v. Denver Tramway Corp., 97 Colo. 523, 50 P.2d 791 (1935)	Describes the specific function of the notice of appeal as requiring the trial court clerk to certify the record for review.	The court invoked Hull to emphasize that the notice of appeal's specific procedural role is to prompt certification of the record, further distinguishing it from pleadings service obligations.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court of Colorado examined the court of appeals' dismissal and the rules cited by that court. It determined that the court of appeals relied upon C.A.R. 4(a), but noted that rule addressed the initial filing of a notice of appeal with the district court and neither expressly nor impliedly required service of the notice of appeal on parties or non-parties. The opinion identified C.A.R. 3(d) (in effect when the appeal was initiated) as the pertinent rule regarding notice: it required the trial court clerk to serve notice of the filing of a notice of appeal by mailing a copy to counsel of record of each party other than the appellant. The court observed that failure of the clerk to serve such notice (which was not alleged here) does not affect the validity of an appeal under that rule.

The court further reasoned that a district court order designating persons to receive "copies of all pleadings" does not, by its terms, encompass service of a notice of appeal upon those designees. The court explained that "pleadings" are formal allegations intended to provide notice of claims and defenses under C.R.C.P. 7(a) (citing Rasmussen), whereas the notice of appeal serves distinct functions: to apprise parties of the appeal's pendency (Widener) and to require the clerk to certify the record (Hull). Because the notice of appeal is not a "pleading" under the strict definition relied upon, the August 16 order did not require service of the notice of appeal on the named individuals who had not entered appearances.

The court concluded that it could discern no procedural defect or omission in the plaintiffs' handling of the notice of appeal that would warrant dismissal of the appeal.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court of appeals with directions to reinstate the appeal.

Implications: The direct effect is that the dismissal by the court of appeals is undone and the appeal is to be reinstated. The Court's analysis clarifies that (1) a trial court's order requiring service of "copies of all pleadings" on named persons does not, by itself, require service of a notice of appeal on nonparties who have not entered appearances, and (2) the relevant appellate rules at the time (including C.A.R. 3(d)) prescribed the clerk's notice obligations to counsel of record rather than imposing additional service obligations that would invalidate an appeal if unmet. The opinion does not address or announce any broader new rule of law beyond the disposition in this case.

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In the Matter of the Estate of: Charles R. Jones, Deceased Harold M. Alldredge and William F. Alledredge, Claimants-Petitioners, v. Blanche Forbis, Claimant-Respondent, and United Bank of Fort Collins, N.A., Trustee-Respondent.

JUSTICE ERICKSON delivered the Opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to review an unpublished opinion of the court of appeals which dismissed an appeal following the denial by the Larimer County District Court of a motion for a final accounting and distribution of the corpus of a testamentary trust. The court of appeals held that the failure of the appellants to give notice of the appeal to certain persons named in the trust who were not parties and did not enter appearances but who were named in the district court's order as persons upon whom "copies of all pleadings" were to be served mandated dismissal of the appeal. We disagree and reverse and remand with directions.

A testamentary trust was established by Charles Jones in favor of his daughter for her lifetime, and named the Poudre Valley National Bank of Fort Collins as trustee. Following the death of the life estate beneficiary in 1982, the petitioners, William and Harold Alldredge, filed a petition for the ascertainment of beneficiaries and a final accounting, and asserted an interest as survivors and remaindermen in the distribution of the corpus of the trust. On August 16, 1982, the district court set the matter for a hearing, specified the names and addresses of persons named in the trust to whom "copies of all pleadings" were to be sent, and ordered that entries of appearance be filed within forty-five days. The trustee subsequently entered an appearance and asserted an interpretation of the trust that was contrary to that asserted by the petitioners. The district court adopted the interpretation advanced by the trustee following a hearing, and denied the petition for ascertainment of beneficiaries and a final accounting.

Following the denial of their motions to alter and amend the judgment and for rehearing and reconsideration, the petitioners filed a notice of appeal. Copies of the notice of appeal were sent by both the petitioners and the clerk of the Larimer County District Court to each party who entered an appearance in the action, but not to other persons named in the trust who did not enter an appearance in the action. However, on April 5, 1984, the court of appeals dismissed the appeal on the ground that the petitioners "failed to give notice of this appeal to each of those individuals named in the trial court's August 16, 1982 order, which specifically sets forth the names and addresses of each person upon whom `copies of all pleadings' were to be served . . . ."

In dismissing the appeal, the court of appeals relied upon rule 4(a) of the Colorado Appellate Rules. However, the provisions of rule 4(a) govern only the initial filing of a notice of appeal with the district court by the appellant, and neither expressly nor impliedly require the service of notice of an appeal upon parties or non-parties. The pertinent appellate rule in effect at the time this appeal was initiated required the clerk of the trial court to "serve notice of the filing of a notice of appeal by mailing a copy thereof to counsel of record of each party other than the appellant." C.A.R. 3(d). However, the failure of the clerk to serve the requisite notice, which is not the case here, does not affect the validity of the appeal. Id.

The applicable rule was amended in 1984.

Under some circumstances, the failure of a party to comply with a directive or order of the court may be grounds for the dismissal of an appeal. See C.A.R. 3(a). However, we can discern no procedural defect or omission that would warrant the dismissal of the appeal in this case. In our view, the district court's August 16 order designating the parties upon whom "copies of all pleadings" were to be served did not encompass service of notice of the appeal upon those persons so designated. "Pleadings" are the formal allegations by the parties of their respective claims and defenses, and are intended to provide notice of what is to be expected at trial. C.R.C.P. 7(a). See Rasmussen v. Freehling, 159 Colo. 414, 412 P.2d 217 (1966). The notice of appeal is intended to apprise parties in the litigation of the pendency of an appeal and to identify the action of the trial court from which the appeal is taken. Widener v. District Court, 200 Colo. 398, 615 P.2d 33 (1980). The specific function of the notice of appeal is to require the clerk of the district court from which the appeal is taken to certify the record for review. Hull v. Denver Tramway Corp., 97 Colo. 523, 50 P.2d 791 (1935). The notice of appeal is not a "pleading" within the strict definition of the term, nor was it required to be served upon the individuals designated in the district court's August 16 order.

The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court of appeals with directions to reinstate the appeal.

IN RE ESTATE OF JONES