PEOPLE v. PETERSON

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Docket Number

Docket No. 85033.

Attorney(S)

Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, L. Brooks Patterson, Prosecuting Attorney, Robert C. Williams, Chief, Appellate Division, and John L. Kroneman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people. Stuart L. Young, for defendant.

Judges

PER CURIAM.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On January 10, 1985, defendant entered guilty pleas to three charges: (1) unlawfully driving away an automobile (UDAA), MCL 750.413; MSA 28.645; (2) breaking and entering with intent to commit larceny, MCL 750.110; MSA 28.305; and (3) habitual offender — third offense, MCL 769.11; MSA 28.1083. The trial court sentenced defendant on the same date: 3 to 5 years for the UDAA conviction, 3 to 10 years for the breaking and entering conviction (which sentence was later vacated by the court), and 6 to 20 years for the habitual offender conviction, with the sentences to run concurrently. From a May 9, 1985 order denying defendant's motion to withdraw his plea, defendant appealed as of right.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the trial judge's failure to explicitly state on the record whether she had made any plea or sentence agreement with any party, as required by GCR 1963, 785.7(4)(b) (now MCR 6.101(F)(4)(b)), requires reversal.
Whether sentencing defendant as an habitual offender after his prior record was already scored for purposes of determining the applicable minimum sentence on the breaking and entering conviction constitutes cruel and unusual punishment (i.e., whether defendant was punished twice for the same offense).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The trial judge's failure to state whether there was any plea or sentence agreement violated GCR 1963, 785.7(4)(b) (now MCR 6.101(F)(4)(b)) and requires reversal.
Sentencing the defendant as an habitual offender after his prior record had already been scored for the breaking and entering conviction amounted to cruel and unusual punishment because it effectively punished him twice for the same offense.

People's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments from the prosecution.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich. 96, 113; 235 N.W.2d 132 (1975)	Noncompliance with a court rule governing pleas does not mandate reversal in every case.	The court relied on this principle to conclude that the judge's failure to state on the record whether an agreement existed did not automatically require reversal.
People v Clardy, 130 Mich. App. 438, 440; 343 N.W.2d 587 (1983)	If a defendant does not claim there was a plea bargain involving a sentence agreement submitted to the judge for approval, the judge's failure to state there was no agreement is immaterial.	The court cited Clardy to support the conclusion that absence of an on-the-record statement was immaterial where the defendant did not assert an agreement existed.
People v Love, 76 Mich. App. 379, 383; 256 N.W.2d 602 (1977)	Quoted authority supporting the same principle articulated in Clardy regarding immateriality of the judge's statement when no agreement is claimed.	The court referenced Love (via Clardy's quotation) to reinforce that the judge's omission did not warrant reversal in this context.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

On the plea-agreement issue, the court observed that noncompliance with the relevant court rule does not automatically require reversal, citing Guilty Plea Cases. The court noted that defendant did not claim there had been any plea bargain involving a sentence agreement submitted to the judge for approval; therefore, the judge's failure to state on the record that there was no agreement was immaterial. The court relied on People v Clardy, which quotes People v Love, to support this proposition. The court also pointed out that a brief discussion between defense counsel and the trial judge just prior to sentencing indicated no such agreement had been made in this case.

On the cruel-and-unusual/double-punishment argument, the court explained that the sentencing guidelines explicitly state they do not apply to habitual offender convictions. The guidelines provide a recommended minimum range, whereas the habitual offender statute operates to enhance the maximum range. Based on these distinctions, the court concluded that the defendant's claim of being punished twice for the same offense was without merit.

Holding and Implications

AFFIRMED

Holding: The trial court's May 9, 1985 order denying defendant's motion to withdraw his plea was affirmed.

Implications: The direct effect is that the defendant's convictions and sentences as described in the opinion remain in place. The opinion does not announce or discuss any broader precedential changes beyond applying existing authorities to the facts of this case; no new legal rule was created.

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PEOPLE v PETERSON

PER CURIAM.

On January 10, 1985, defendant entered a plea of guilty to the following charges: (1) unlawfully driving away an automobile (UDAA), MCL 750.413; MSA 28.645; (2) breaking and entering with intent to commit larceny, MCL 750.110; MSA 28.305; and (3) habitual offender — third offense, MCL 769.11; MSA 28.1083. Defendant was sentenced on the same date to from 3 to 5 years imprisonment for the UDAA conviction, 3 to 10 years on the breaking and entering conviction, which was later vacated by the court, and 6 to 20 years on the habitual offender conviction, the sentences to run concurrently. From a May 9, 1985, order denying defendant's motion to withdraw his plea, defendant appeals as of right.

Defendant maintains that the trial judge's failure to explicitly state whether she had made any plea or sentence agreement with any party, as required by GCR 1963, 785.7(4)(b), now MCR 6.101(F)(4)(b), requires reversal. However, noncompliance with the court rule does not mandate reversal in every case. Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich. 96, 113; 235 N.W.2d 132 (1975). Where, as here, the defendant does not claim that "there was any plea bargain involving a sentence agreement which had been submitted to the judge for approval, it is immaterial that the judge did not state on the record that there was no agreement on [the judge's] part". People v Clardy, 130 Mich. App. 438, 440; 343 N.W.2d 587 (1983), quoting People v Love, 76 Mich. App. 379, 383; 256 N.W.2d 602 (1977). Moreover, we note that a brief discussion between defense counsel and the trial judge just prior to sentencing indicates that no such agreement was made in this case.

Defendant next argues that his sentence was cruel and unusual punishment since he was sentenced as an habitual offender after his prior record was already scored for purposes of determining the applicable minimal sentence on the breaking and entering conviction. He maintains that he was punished twice for the same offense. The sentencing guidelines explicitly state that they do not apply to habitual offender convictions. Moreover, the guidelines provide a recommended minimum range, whereas the habitual offender statute provides for enhancement of the maximum range. Based on these factors, we find that defendant's argument is without merit.

Affirmed.