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Docket Number

Docket No. 80687.

Attorney(S)

Sommers, Schwartz, Silver Schwartz, P.C. (by Jeffrey N. Shillman), for plaintiffs. Plunkett, Cooney, Rutt, Watters, Stanczyk Pedersen, P.C. (by Deanna E. Hazen and William D. Shailor), for defendants.

Judges

PER CURIAM.

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Smart Summary

Case Summary: Walker v. Caldwell, Michigan Court of Appeals, Decided February 4, 1986 (Docket No. 80687)

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiffs Allison Walker (a 15-year-old passenger), Horace Walker and Georgia Walker sued defendants Derrick Caldwell (driver, age 16) and Ollie Caldwell (vehicle owner) to recover noneconomic damages under MCL 500.3135 (the Michigan no-fault threshold statute) for injuries Allison sustained in an automobile accident on Belle Isle on May 27, 1982. Allison was rendered unconscious, taken to the hospital, and on examination had multiple contusions and abrasions and an x-ray showing a compression fracture of the L3 vertebra. She was discharged the next day.

In deposition, Dr. Simaika described Allison's injury as a "minimal compression fracture" of the L3 vertebra, indicating the condition "doesn't lose too much of its height" and that the minimal compression "really has no significance." He testified, however, that Allison would probably experience some lifetime back discomfort when bending, be prematurely susceptible to arthritis in the fractured area, should treat future pain with analgesics, avoid strenuous bending activity, and refrain from lifting more than 20 pounds. Allison testified she cannot lift certain things, takes Tylenol 4 for intermittent cramp-like lower back pain, and can no longer regularly play softball as she once did.

Defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting Allison's injury did not constitute a "serious impairment of body function" as required by MCL 500.3135 to recover noneconomic damages. The Wayne County Circuit Court (Judge Sullivan) granted the defendants' motion, concluding plaintiffs failed to satisfy the statutory threshold. Plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether plaintiff Allison Walker suffered a "serious impairment of body function" within the meaning of MCL 500.3135(1), thereby meeting the statutory threshold for recovery of noneconomic damages.
Whether summary judgment was proper when there was no material factual dispute regarding the nature and extent of Allison's injuries, making the threshold issue one of law.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants' Arguments

Defendants moved for summary judgment contending that Allison's injuries did not, as a matter of law, constitute a "serious impairment of body function" under § 3135 of the no-fault act.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of plaintiffs' opposing legal arguments beyond the factual allegations and plaintiffs' claim that Allison suffered a serious impairment of body function.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Cassidy v. McGovern, 415 Mich. 483, 330 N.W.2d 22 (1982)	Where there is no material factual dispute regarding the nature and extent of a plaintiff's injuries, the question of "serious impairment of body function" is a question of law appropriate for summary judgment; even where factual disputes exist, if not material to the threshold determination, the court decides the threshold as a matter of law.	The court applied Cassidy to conclude that because there was no material factual dispute about Allison's injuries, the serious-impairment question could be decided on defendants' summary judgment motion.
Kelleher v. Kuchta, 138 Mich. App. 45, 359 N.W.2d 224 (1984)	Establishes an appellate standard of review for trial court rulings on the serious-impairment question: review under the "clearly erroneous" standard, affording deference to the trial court's factual determinations.	The court noted and adopted the clearly erroneous standard of review for the trial court's ruling on the serious-impairment issue and affirmed the trial court's decision unless clearly erroneous.
Routley v. Dault, 140 Mich. App. 190, 363 N.W.2d 450 (1984)	Holds the serious-impairment inquiry is case-by-case and that seriousness must be judged by objective evaluation of effect on body functions and ability to perform common day-to-day activities (not extrinsic factors like employment).	The court relied on Routley to emphasize objective evaluation of how the injury affected the plaintiff's ability to lead a normal life and perform daily activities in deciding the threshold issue.
Williams v. Payne, 131 Mich. App. 403, 346 N.W.2d 564 (1984)	Sets out three evolving standards: impairment must affect an important body function; the impairment must be serious; and the injuries must be objectively manifested.	The court cited Williams to identify the elements required for a "serious impairment of body function" and used those elements as part of its analysis of Allison's injuries.
Kucera v. Norton, 140 Mich. App. 156, 363 N.W.2d 11 (1984)	Indicates "serious impairment of body function" claims should be grouped with other noneconomic losses such as "death" and "permanent serious disfigurement."	The court cited Kucera to underscore the character of serious-impairment claims as those meriting the same categorical treatment as other severe noneconomic losses.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a stepwise legal analysis grounded in the cited authorities and the undisputed medical evidence:

Threshold procedural posture: Because the facts and medical testimony regarding Allison's injury were undisputed, Cassidy permits the court to decide the "serious impairment" threshold as a matter of law on summary judgment. The court found no material factual dispute regarding the nature and extent of Allison's injuries.
Standard of appellate review: The Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court's determination under the "clearly erroneous" standard articulated in Kelleher, giving deference to the trial court's ruling unless it was clearly erroneous.
Substantive standard for "serious impairment": The court summarized the developing standards from authority (Williams, Routley, Kucera): the impairment must affect an important body function, be serious, be objectively manifested, and be evaluated by its effect on the person's ability to perform ordinary day-to-day activities and lead a normal life (the Routley formulation).
Application to the undisputed facts: Allison's injury was diagnosed as a minimal compression fracture of the L3 vertebra. Her temporary treatment included a lumbosacral corset and short-term pain medication. The permanent consequences, as shown by the record, were limited to some restriction on bending and lifting, occasional need for analgesics, and inability to regularly participate in softball as before. There was no evidence that her ability to lead a normal life had been significantly affected.
Conclusion based on legal standard: Applying the legal standards to the undisputed facts, the court concluded Allison's injury did not meet the statutory threshold of a "serious impairment of body function." Accordingly, the trial court's grant of summary judgment was correct and not clearly erroneous.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment. The court's core ruling is summarized as: AFFIRMED.

Implications:

The immediate consequence is that plaintiffs' claim for noneconomic damages under MCL 500.3135 was dismissed and defendants' motion for summary judgment was upheld; Allison Walker did not meet the statutory threshold for recovery of noneconomic damages.
The opinion applies and follows existing precedent (Cassidy and subsequent Michigan appellate decisions) in treating the threshold question as one appropriate for summary disposition when the relevant medical facts are undisputed and reiterates the objective, case-by-case standards (important body function, seriousness, objective manifestation, and effect on daily life) courts use in evaluating serious-impairment claims.
The opinion does not announce a new legal rule; it applies established precedent to the specific, undisputed factual record and does not purport to expand the law beyond that application.

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WALKER v CALDWELL

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiffs, Allison Walker, Horace Walker and Georgia Walker, commenced this action against defendants, Derrick Caldwell and Ollie Caldwell, to recover noneconomic damages sustained by Allison Walker as a result of an automobile accident pursuant to MCL 500.3135; MSA 24.13135. The action was dismissed by the Wayne County Circuit Court on defendant's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appeal and we affirm.

The facts of this case are not in dispute. Plaintiff Allison Walker was involved in an automobile accident that occurred on Belle Isle on May 27, 1982, at the intersection of Lakeside Drive and Central. Plaintiff Allison Walker is a 15-year-old girl who was a passenger in an automobile driven by defendant Derrick Caldwell, age 16, when the vehicle left the road and struck a tree. Defendant Ollie Caldwell is the owner of the vehicle. Allison was rendered unconscious by the collision and transported to Detroit Receiving Hospital. Upon regaining consciousness at the hospital she stated that she was having pain in her lower back, shoulder, left knee and ribs. A physical examination revealed multiple contusions and abrasions, and x-rays disclosed a compression fracture of the L3 vertebra. Plaintiff was discharged the following day.

In his deposition, Dr. Simaika stated that Allison had suffered a minimal compression fracture involving the entire vertebral body. He explained that a minimal compression fracture occurs when the vertebral body is sandwiched together, but it doesn't lose too much of its height. He stated that such a minimal compression really has no significance. However, Dr. Simaika indicated that Allison would probably have some back discomfort for the rest of her life when she bends over to pick something up and that the discomfort will vary with the temperature and humidity. He further indicated that she would be prematurely susceptible to arthritis in the fractured area, and that Allison's future pain will be treated with analgesics and she is to avoid strenuous activity involving bending over. Also, she shouldn't lift weights over 20 pounds.

Allison testified that the only thing she can't do is lift certain things. She takes "Tylenol 4" when she gets a cramp-like pain in her lower back. She also contended that she can no longer regularly participate in softball games, as she once did.

Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that Allison's injury did not constitute a serious impairment of body function as a matter of law. Judge Sullivan ruled that plaintiffs failed to meet the threshold requirement of "serious impairment of body function" under § 3135 of the no-fault act and granted defendants' motion.

In the instant case, plaintiffs' claim for noneconomic damages arising out of the automobile accident is based on MCL 500.3135(1); MSA 24.13135(1), which provides in pertinent part as follows:

"A person remains subject to tort liability for noneconomic loss caused by his or her ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle only if the injured person has suffered death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement."

Here, plaintiff Allison alleges that she suffered serious impairment of a body function as a result of the accident. In Cassidy v McGovern, 415 Mich. 483, 502; 330 N.W.2d 22 (1982), our Supreme Court held that where there is no material factual dispute regarding the nature and extent of a plaintiff's injuries, the question of serious impairment of body function must be decided as a matter of law, thereby making it a proper issue for disposition on a motion for summary judgment. GCR 1963, 117.2(3), now MCR 2.116(C)(10). Likewise, even if there is a factual dispute as to the nature and extent of a plaintiff's injuries, but the dispute is not material to the determination of whether the plaintiff has suffered a serious impairment of body function, the court shall rule as a matter of law whether the threshold requirement of § 3135 of the no-fault act has been met. Cassidy, supra, p 502.

In the case at bar, there is no material factual dispute regarding the nature and extent of plaintiff Allison's injuries. Defendants do not dispute the medical evidence or testimony, nor do they dispute Allison's future prognosis. Therefore, whether Allison suffered a serious impairment of a body function was properly presented for disposition on defendants' motion for summary judgment. Id.

A trial judge's ruling on the serious impairment question is reviewed by this Court on a clearly erroneous standard. Kelleher v Kuchta, 138 Mich. App. 45; 359 N.W.2d 224 (1984). There, the Court stated the following:

"Unless this Court is going to end up simply `second guessing' the trial courts in these Cassidy cases, we must adopt some standard for appellate review which accords some deference to the trial judge who actually saw the evidence unfold, at least until our Supreme Court provides us with more definitive guidance. We believe that an appropriate standard is that unless the trial court's ruling was clearly erroneous we should affirm the findings of the trial court." 138 Mich. App. 47.

The question of serious impairment of body function is decided on a case-by-case basis. Routley v Dault, 140 Mich. App. 190, 193; 363 N.W.2d 450 (1984). Although no clear lines have been drawn in finding "serious impairment of a body function", a few standards have evolved that assist the courts in making that determination. First, impairment of a body function actually means impairment of an important body function; second, the impairment must be serious; and third, the injuries must be objectively manifested. Williams v Payne, 131 Mich. App. 403, 409; 346 N.W.2d 564 (1984). Recovery cannot be predicated on pain and suffering alone, but only on injuries that affect the functioning of the body. Cassidy, supra, p 505. "Serious impairment of body function" claims should be grouped with such noneconomic losses as "death" and "permanent serious disfigurement". Kucera v Norton, 140 Mich. App. 156, 158; 363 N.W.2d 11 (1984).

Central to the determination of whether an injury has affected an important body function or whether it is serious is how that injury has affected the plaintiff's ability to lead a normal life. In Routley, supra, this Court stated:

"The seriousness of the injury must be determined by an objective evaluation of its effect on the person's body functions and the ability to perform common day-to-day activities, and not by extrinsic considerations such as the nature of the person's employment." 140 Mich. App. 195.

In the instant case, the plaintiff's injuries do not meet the "serious impairment of body function" threshold. Plaintiff Allison suffered a minimal compression fracture of the L3 vertebra. As a result, she had to wear a lumbosacral corset and take pain medication for a short period of time. The only permanent effects resulting from her injury are that she cannot bend and lift as she once used to and she may have to take pain medication from time to time to alleviate discomfort in her lower back. There is no evidence that Allison's ability to lead a normal life has been significantly affected.

The trial court did not err in determining that plaintiff Allison had not suffered a serious impairment of body function under the no-fault act.

Affirmed.

WALKER v. CALDWELL