Main, J.P.
Plaintiff commenced this action seeking to recover damages incurred by her, allegedly due to the medical malpractice of defendants Donald P. Swartz and Martin B. Wingate. As a result of such alleged malpractice, which plaintiff claims took place during the doctors' care of her mother during her pregnancy and the delivery of plaintiff, she presently suffers from a learning disability, a speech impairment and deficient motor coordination.
After Swartz and Wingate answered, plaintiff made a motion, the substance of which is irrelevant to this appeal, and demanded from Swartz and Wingate a verified bill of particulars concerning, inter alia, potential defenses that may be asserted pursuant to Public Health Law § 2805-d (4). In response to plaintiff's motion and demand to particularize, Swartz and Wingate cross-moved for an order, inter alia, (1) dismissing plaintiffs cause of action for lack of informed consent, and (2) vacating plaintiff's demand for a bill of particulars or, in the alternative, for leave to amend their answer to include the defenses of Public Health Law § 2805-d (4). Special Term denied the cross motion to dismiss plaintiff's cause of action for lack of informed consent and to vacate the demand for a bill of particulars, but did grant Swartz and Wingate leave to amend their answer to assert the defenses of Public Health Law § 2805-d (4). This appeal by Swartz ensued.
We initially reject the argument advanced by Swartz that plaintiff's cause of action for lack of informed consent should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. Affording the complaint a liberal construction (see, CPLR 3026; Macey v New York State Elec. Gas Corp., 80 A.D.2d 669), we conclude that the pleading's statement of the cause of action in question, while inartfully drawn, is not insufficient as a matter of law (see, Torres v. Southside Hosp., 84 A.D.2d 836; see also, Grcic v Peninsula Hosp. Center, 110 A.D.2d 625; cf. Anderson v. Wiener, 100 A.D.2d 919) since a cause of action can be made out from it (see, Guggenheimer v. Ginzburg, 43 N.Y.2d 268, 275).
Swartz next contends that Special Term should have vacated plaintiff's demand for a bill of particulars as to the defenses under Public Health Law § 2805-d (4). The matters raised in the statute, while labeled "defenses", are classic examples of matters which would "raise issues of fact not appearing on the face of a prior pleading" (CPLR 3018 [b]). As such, they are affirmative defenses as to which the defendant is required to give a bill of particulars (see, Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C3018:13, p 149; see also, Grossman v. Osteopathic Hosp. Clinic, 121 Misc.2d 533, 534-535).
Order affirmed, with costs. Main, J.P., Casey, Weiss, Mikoll and Harvey, JJ., concur.