Judgment reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, and proceeding dismissed on the merits. No questions of fact have been raised or considered.
We disagree with Special Term's determination that the petitioner was denied his right to due process. The petitioner was accorded every right to which he was entitled in the context of a disciplinary proceeding instituted by a private university (see, Tedeschi v. Wagner Coll., 70 A.D.2d 934, 935, revd on other grounds 49 N.Y.2d 652; Ayton v. Bean, 80 A.D.2d 839, 840). Moreover, since the determination to suspend the petitioner was rendered in accordance with the university's published regulations (see, Tedeschi v. Wagner Coll., supra; Matter of Fain v. Brooklyn Coll., 112 A.D.2d 992), and was based upon the exercise of honest discretion after a full review of the operative facts, it was neither arbitrary nor capricious so as to warrant judicial intervention (see, Matter of Harris v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 62 N.Y.2d 956, revg 98 A.D.2d 58, 67-73, for reasons stated in dissent of Kassal, J., at App. Div.; Matter of Patti Ann H. v New York Med. Coll., 88 A.D.2d 296, 301, affd 58 N.Y.2d 734; Matter of Carr v. St. John's Univ., 17 A.D.2d 632, 634, affd 12 N.Y.2d 802). Finally, we do not consider the penalty imposed to have been "`"so disproportionate to the offense, in light of all the circumstances, as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness"'" (Matter of Pell v. Board of Educ., 34 N.Y.2d 222, 233; Matter of Kramer v. Kinney, 87 A.D.2d 870). Lazer, J.P., Mangano, Bracken and Niehoff, JJ., concur.