SMITH v. MALARCZYK, N.Y. App. Div., Judgment, Law, casemine.com

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Yesawich, Jr., J.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On October 4, 1982, plaintiff Imogene Smith was driving to a dentist appointment when her vehicle collided with a car driven by defendant Emil Malarczyk. Defendant was backing out of a driveway, with his car partially stopped in the road. Defendant claimed plaintiff negligently failed to observe his vehicle, while plaintiff contended that defendant's car suddenly emerged into the road. The investigating officer issued a ticket to defendant for unsafe backing. Plaintiff filed a negligence suit seeking damages for personal injuries, and her husband brought a derivative claim for her lost services. At trial, the parties gave conflicting accounts of the accident. Defendant's daughter-in-law, Rosita Malarczyk, testified in support of the defense, although plaintiff objected due to defendant’s prior denial of any witnesses. The trial court admitted excerpts from plaintiff’s 1976 medical records, which defendant used to impeach her testimony regarding prior neck problems. The jury requested definitions of medical terms related to plaintiff's fainting symptoms, which the court provided without objection. The jury returned a verdict for defendant, and plaintiffs appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the trial court erred in refusing to impose sanctions on defendant for knowingly providing false testimony during pre-trial examination regarding the existence of an eyewitness.
Whether the admission of excerpts from plaintiff’s prior medical records referencing fainting episodes was improper and prejudicial.
Whether the jury’s verdict was supported by sufficient evidence despite the procedural errors identified.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

Defendant knowingly provided false testimony by denying the existence of any witnesses to the accident, despite being aware that his daughter-in-law had witnessed it and informed both him and defense counsel.
The trial court’s refusal to sanction defendant under CPLR 3126 for this misconduct denied plaintiff a fair trial.
The admission of medical record excerpts referencing fainting episodes was irrelevant to the neck injury claim and unduly prejudicial, warranting redaction.

Respondent's Arguments

The daughter-in-law’s testimony had no bearing on liability and thus defendant’s failure to disclose her as a witness was harmless.
The prior fainting episodes were relevant to impeach plaintiff’s claim of no prior neck problems.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Lenahan v. Goucher, 65 N.Y.2d 1034	Standard for sufficiency of evidence to support jury verdict on negligence liability.	Confirmed that the evidence supported the jury’s finding that plaintiff was solely responsible for the accident.
Clark v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 328 F.2d 591, 594; cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1006	Condemnation of winning lawsuits by deceit and the importance of candor for the administration of justice.	Supported the court’s view that defendant’s failure to disclose the witness was a serious breach undermining the integrity of the trial.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court acknowledged that the evidence was sufficient to uphold the jury’s verdict assigning sole fault to plaintiff. However, it found reversible error in the trial court’s refusal to sanction defendant for knowingly providing false testimony during pre-trial examination by denying the existence of an eyewitness, his daughter-in-law. This falsehood was undisputed, deliberate, and remained uncorrected for over a year until trial, undermining the fairness of the proceedings. The court rejected defendant’s claim that the witness’s testimony was irrelevant, emphasizing that she was the only nonparty eyewitness and her testimony corroborated defendant’s account on a critical issue. The court also found that the admission of medical record excerpts referencing plaintiff’s fainting episodes was improper because the underlying cause of the prior neck injury was irrelevant and speculative, warranting redaction. These errors collectively warranted reversal and a new trial, with leave for plaintiffs to depose the witness before trial.

Holding and Implications

The court REVERSED the judgment of the Supreme Court, Ulster County, and remitted the matter for a new trial. It granted plaintiffs leave to conduct a pretrial examination of the witness Rosita Malarczyk.

The decision directly affects the parties by vacating the prior verdict and ordering a new trial to ensure fairness and integrity in the proceedings. No new legal precedent was established beyond reaffirming existing principles regarding witness disclosure, trial fairness, and relevancy of evidence.

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IMOGENE SMITH et al., Appellants, v. EMIL MALARCZYK, Respondent.

Yesawich, Jr., J.

On the morning of October 4, 1982, plaintiff Imogene Smith (hereinafter plaintiff) was en route to a dentist appointment when the automobile she was operating collided with one being driven by defendant; he had been backing out of a driveway and claims that plaintiff negligently failed to observe his car, which was stopped at the time with the rear portion in the road. Plaintiff maintained that defendant's car emerged suddenly; the investigating officer ticketed defendant for unsafe backing. In the negligence suit which followed, plaintiff sought to recover for personal injuries she sustained in the incident and her husband brought a derivative claim for her lost services.

At trial, plaintiff and defendant related their respective versions of the accident. There were no witnesses to the occurrence other than defendant's daughter-in-law, Rosita Malarczyk, who corroborated the defense. Plaintiff unsuccessfully objected to that testimony on the ground that, when specifically asked at his examination before trial whether he was aware of any witnesses to the accident, defendant, knowing full well that his answer was spurious, swore there were none. Also unavailing were plaintiff's efforts to prevent introduction into evidence of excerpts from a medical record relating to her hospitalization in 1976., Those excerpts, offered by defendant to impeach plaintiff, who had testified that prior to this accident she had no problems with her neck, disclosed that she had complained of fainting spells, during one of which the right side of her neck was injured. In the course of its deliberations, the jury asked the trial court to define various medical terms appearing in those excerpts which described the symptoms associated with plaintiff's fainting; there being no objection from counsel, the court granted the request. From the verdict in favor of defendant, plaintiffs appeal.

Although the evidence is sufficient to support the jury's verdict imposing sole responsibility for the accident on plaintiff (see, Lenahan v. Goucher, 65 N.Y.2d 1034), a reversal is nevertheless appropriate for plaintiff was not afforded a fair trial. Initially, we note that nothing in the trial record suggests that defendant's failure to reveal that the daughter-in-law saw the accident was inadvertent, excusable or tolerable. She testified at trial that she informed defendant that she had observed the accident soon after it happened and, further, that on the day defendant's deposition was taken, she also told the same to defense counsel. Given the undisputed untruthfulness of defendant's testimony at his examination before trial that there were no witnesses, and that this falsity was allowed to remain uncorrected for more than a year thereafter when it was discovered by plaintiff at the trial itself, the trial court's refusal to impose sanctions, as requested by plaintiff pursuant to CPLR 3126, constituted reversible error.

Defendant's assertion that the daughter-in-law's testimony "had absolutely no bearing on the liability" is patently disingenuous. She was the only nonparty witness to the accident and her testimony that she noticed defendant's car stopped at the end of the driveway, saw the movement of plaintiff's car traveling "real fast", and then heard a crash, was consistent with defendant's account on a pivotal issue, and obviously telling. Winning lawsuits by guile is no longer fashionable or condonable for it does nothing to further the effective administration of justice (see, Clark v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 328 F.2d 591, 594, cert denied, 377 U.S. 1006).

Plaintiff's objection to the admission into evidence of references in the hospital record excerpts to her fainting episodes also has force. Those excerpts are only pertinent with respect to plaintiff's neck injuries. The underlying cause of her 1976 injury — fainting — is irrelevant here since it is susceptible of undue speculation and all allusions to it, consonant with plaintiff's request at trial, should have been redacted.

Judgment reversed, on the law and facts, with costs, and matter remitted to Supreme Court for a new trial and with leave to plaintiffs to conduct an examination before trial of the witness Rosita Malarczyk, if they are so inclined. Mahoney, P.J., Casey, Mikoll, Yesawich, Jr., and Harvey, JJ., concur.

SMITH v. MALARCZYK