Order reversed, on the law, and motion denied.
The fact that there are outstanding charges as to which a defendant's right to counsel has attached does not preclude questioning on new charges, unless the police know or have reason to know that the defendant is actually represented on the outstanding charges (People v. Lucarano, 61 N.Y.2d 138, 145). The instant record indicates that the arresting officer was aware of an outstanding arrest warrant for the defendant dating back to 1978. He did not inquire whether the defendant was represented by counsel and therefore was chargeable with whatever a reasonable inquiry would have revealed (see, People v. Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d 225). However, at the Huntley hearing, the defendant failed to meet his burden of proof showing that he was actually represented by counsel on the pending 1978 charge (see, People v. Rosa, 65 N.Y.2d 380, 388). Since the defendant's failure to establish actual representation on the pending charge is not a ground for a new hearing (see, People v. Sepe, 108 A.D.2d 941, lv denied 65 N.Y.2d 820; People v. Donovon, 107 A.D.2d 433, 442; People v. Quarles, 63 N.Y.2d 923, 925; People v. Havelka, 45 N.Y.2d 636, 642-644) and the record does not otherwise indicate that the defendant was represented by counsel on the 1978 charges, the defendant's statements regarding the new charges should not have been suppressed. Accordingly, we reverse. Gibbons, J.P., Bracken, Weinstein and Niehoff, JJ., concur.