Domestic Relations Law § 244, as amended (L 1980, ch 241, § 2; ch 645 § 5; L 1981, ch 695, § 4), has divested the court of discretion in deciding whether to enter judgment on a motion for support arrearages. It must direct the entry of such a judgment "`unless the defaulting party shows good cause for failure to make application for relief from the judgment or order directing such payment prior to the accrual of such arrears'". (Vigo v Vigo, 97 A.D.2d 463 [2d Dept 1983]; Coveleski v. Coveleski, 93 A.D.2d 924 [3d Dept 1983].) Special Term should have granted the cross motion to the extent of directing that judgment be entered against defendant for the outstanding arrears and previously awarded attorney's fees of $500. The defendant failed to pay the attorney's fees and after September 21, 1984, unilaterally ceased making all but token payments as directed by the interim order (Gabel, J.) entered August 13, 1984. He also did not demonstrate good cause for his failure to seek relief prior to his motion, dated January 24, 1985, to cancel and suspend arrears. However, it is uncontroverted that plaintiff has received $3,000 pursuant to the order at Special Term. On this appeal plaintiff concedes a slight mathematical error in the computation of the sum owed. She is entitled to a judgment against defendant for the sum of $6,783.95, the corrected amount of $9,783.95 less a setoff of $3,000.
The defendant was clearly not entitled, based upon alleged interference with his visitation rights, to cancel the arrears which had been reduced to a judgment entered on December 5, 1984, covering payments due under the August 13, 1984 order prior to September 14, 1984, in the amount of $5,086.77, or to suspend temporary support and maintenance payments. He has no enforceable visitation rights under Domestic Relations Law § 241 because there is neither a court order nor a stipulation incorporated by reference into such an order, concerning visitation with the parties' 11-year-old daughter. Although Justice Gabel directed a hearing to determine custody and visitation rights, Justice Ostrau subsequently granted defendant's motion for a change in venue. The record reflects that the hearing was last scheduled to take place on January 11, 1985, in New York County. It apparently has not been rescheduled. In any event, defendant's factual allegations concerning interference with his visitation rights are conclusory, inconsistent, and palpably insufficient to warrant a hearing. (Compare, Vigo v. Vigo, supra, at p 464.)
In view of key inadequacies and deficiencies in the record and conflicting evidence as to the financial status of the respective parties, we affirm the balance of Special Term's order with one exception. (See, Biamby v. Biamby, 114 A.D.2d 830 [2d Dept 1985]; Vigo v. Vigo, supra [error to grant attorney's fees in the absence of testimonial evidence of the financial status of the respective parties, filed net-worth statements, or an examination of plaintiff's ability to pay her attorney].) We also hold that the court erred in upwardly revising the amount payable for weekly support and maintenance pending trial since the provisions of the August 13, 1984 order are in full force and effect.
Settle order.
Concur — Sandler, J.P., Carro, Milonas, Rosenberger and Ellerin, JJ.