J. H. HARVEY COMPANY v. SPEIGHT

Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Docket Number

72197.

Attorney(S)

Mark A. Gonnerman, Dawn G. Benson, for appellant. B. T. Edmonds, Jr., Johnnie M. Graham, for appellee.

Judges

BANKE, Chief Judge.

See more information ...

Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellee sued the appellant, owner of Harvey's Supermarket, seeking damages for false imprisonment and assault and battery. The case was tried before a jury in Dougherty State Court, which awarded the appellee $2,500 in compensatory damages and $30,000 in punitive damages. The appellant appealed, challenging the denial of its motion for a directed verdict on both counts of the complaint.

The incident arose when the store manager, acting on information that several cartons of cigarettes had been stolen, approached the appellee shortly after he had exited the store. The manager, followed by others presumed to be employees, asked if the appellee had anything that did not belong to him. The appellee voluntarily opened his jacket to allow the manager to look inside and identified another person as the suspected thief. The manager then pursued that person. The appellee testified that the encounter lasted between 15 and 45 seconds and that the manager was not rude but that the search was not courteous.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the appellee was subjected to false imprisonment by the appellant's store manager and employees.
Whether the appellee was subjected to assault and battery by the appellant's store manager and employees.
Whether the trial court erred in denying the appellant's motion for a directed verdict on both counts.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Abner v. W. T. Grant Co., 110 Ga. App. 592 (139 S.E.2d 408) (1964)	Requirement of involuntary restraint for false imprisonment	Used to support the conclusion that appellee failed to prove involuntary restraint by the store manager or employees.
Sinclair Refining Co. v. Meek, 62 Ga. App. 850 (10 S.E.2d 76) (1940)	False imprisonment requires restraint by force or fear, even if no effort to escape is made	Reinforced that some form of restraint is necessary to establish false imprisonment, which appellee did not show.
Crowley v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 168 Ga. App. 162 (308 S.E.2d 417) (1983)	Consent negates assault and battery claims	Applied to conclude that appellee's invitation to search negated any claim of assault and battery.
OCGA § 51-7-20	Definition of false imprisonment	Outlined the statutory standard for false imprisonment requiring unlawful and involuntary detention.
OCGA § 51-11-2	Definition of assault and battery	Referenced to establish that consent to touching negates assault and battery claims.
Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed.) § 11	Clarification that false imprisonment requires restraint against plaintiff's will	Supported the court's reasoning that voluntary submission to restraint negates false imprisonment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by defining false imprisonment as unlawful and involuntary detention of a person, even for a brief period, citing OCGA § 51-7-20 and authoritative tort commentary. It emphasized that the restraint must be against the plaintiff's will; voluntary submission to restraint negates the tort. The appellee's own testimony showed he voluntarily allowed the manager to search his jacket and that the manager was not rude or threatening. The court found no evidence of involuntary restraint, referencing Abner and Sinclair Refining to highlight the necessity of force or fear in false imprisonment claims.

Regarding assault and battery, the court noted the appellee admitted inviting the touching, which is inconsistent with assault and battery under OCGA § 51-11-2 and precedent from Crowley. Because the evidence failed to establish involuntary restraint or unconsented touching, the court concluded the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict and held that the trial court erred in denying the appellant's motion for a directed verdict.

Holding and Implications

Judgment reversed.

The court reversed the trial court's denial of the directed verdict motion, effectively overturning the jury's award of damages for false imprisonment and assault and battery. The direct consequence is that the appellee cannot recover damages on these claims based on the evidence presented. The opinion does not establish new precedent but applies existing legal standards to the facts, clarifying the necessity of involuntary restraint and absence of consent in such tort claims.

Show full summary ...

J. H. HARVEY COMPANY v. SPEIGHT.

BANKE, Chief Judge.

The appellee sued the appellant, as owner of Harvey's Supermarket, to recover damages for false imprisonment and assault and battery. A jury awarded him $2,500 in compensatory damages and $30,000 in punitive damages. In this appeal, the appellant enumerates as error the denial of its motion for a directed verdict with regard to both counts of the complaint.

Acting upon information that someone had just stolen several cartons of cigarettes from the store, the appellant's manager stepped outside and approached the appellee, who had himself walked out of the store only moments earlier. The manager was followed by several other persons whom the appellee testified he assumed were also store employees. Upon being asked by the manager if he had anything that did not belong to him, the appellee answered, "No, . . . do you want to see. . . ." He then briefly held the sides of his jacket open and let them close, at which point the manager parted the jacket with his hands to see if anything was concealed there. Simultaneously, the appellee pointed to another person in the immediate vicinity and said, "I think that is the man you are looking for." The manager then left the appellee to pursue this other person.

The appellee testified that the store manager had not been rude to him but stated that he did not consider the manager's conduct in looking inside his jacket as courteous. He admitted that he had invited this search and that the manager had not cursed him nor spoken loudly to him; however, he testified that he felt the manager was angry because of the look in his eyes and the fact that several people had followed the manager out of the store. At trial, the appellee testified that the entire encounter had lasted about 45 seconds, whereas during an earlier deposition he had testified that the encounter lasted between 15 and 30 seconds. Held:

"False imprisonment is the unlawful detention of the person of another, for any length of time, whereby such person is deprived of his personal liberty." OCGA § 51-7-20. "[T]he imprisonment need not be for more than an appreciable length of time, and . . . it is not necessary that any damage result from it other than the confinement itself, since the tort is complete with even a brief restraint of the plaintiff's freedom. . . . It is essential, however, that the restraint be against the plaintiff's will; and if he agrees of his own free choice to surrender his freedom of motion, as by remaining in a room or accompanying the defendant voluntarily, to clear himself of suspicion or to accommodate the desires of another, rather than yielding to the constraint of a threat, then there is no imprisonment." Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed.) 43-45, § 11.

The appellee's testimony in this case fails to establish any involuntary restraint by the appellant's store manager or employees. Accord Abner v. W. T. Grant Co., 110 Ga. App. 592 ( 139 S.E.2d 408) (1964). Although a person need not make an effort to escape or await application of open force before he can recover, there must be restraint whether by force or fear. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Meek, 62 Ga. App. 850 (2) ( 10 S.E.2d 76) (1940). With regard to the second count of the complaint, the appellee admitted that any touching of his person had been invited by him; and such invitation is inconsistent with the tort of assault and battery. See Crowley v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 168 Ga. App. 162 (1) ( 308 S.E.2d 417) (1983); OCGA § 51-11-2. The evidence was consequently insufficient to support any recovery, and it follows that the trial court erred in denying the appellant's motion for directed verdict.

Judgment reversed. Birdsong, P. J., and Sognier, J., concur.

DECIDED APRIL 9, 1986 — REHEARING DENIED APRIL 23, 1986 — CERT. APPLIED FOR.