BIAGINI'S CASE, Mass. App. Ct., Judgment, Law, casemine.com

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Attorney(S)

Earlon L. Seeley, Jr., for the employee. James M. Rabbitt, for the insurer, submitted a brief.

Judges

Fredrick L. Brown

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The employee filed a claim for workers' compensation with the Industrial Accident Board alleging work-related injuries. After a conference before a single member of the board under G.L. c. 152, § 7, an order denying payment was filed. The employee requested a hearing under G.L. c. 152, §§ 7–8, and a different single member ordered payment of compensation. The insurer sought review under G.L. c. 152, § 10. Before the reviewing board heard the insurer's appeal, the employee filed a certified copy of the single member's payment order in the Superior Court seeking enforcement under G.L. c. 152, § 11. A judge of the Superior Court refused to order compliance. The employee appealed the Superior Court's denial. The enforcement proceeding in the Superior Court was initially heard by Judge George J. Hayer.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether a judge in the Superior Court has discretion to deny enforcement of a single member's G.L. c. 152, § 8 order directing payment of workers' compensation when the insurer has appealed that order to the board's reviewing panel.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Assuncao's Case, 372 Mass. 6, 10 (1977)	Describes the purpose of an enforcement proceeding: to give the employee "the power to compel performance of its orders or those of its members."	Used to support the proposition that enforcement under G.L. c. 152, § 11 is mandatory and serves to maintain a status in favor of the employee pending final resolution.
Czarniak's Case, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 467, 469 (1982)	Cited in support of the mandatory enforcement principle articulated in Assuncao's Case.	Relied on together with Assuncao's Case to show the judge lacked discretion to refuse enforcement.
Seymour's Case, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 935 (1978)	Support for the immediate appealability of a Superior Court's refusal to enforce a single member's order.	Cited to show the Superior Court judge's action was immediately appealable.
Kintner's Case, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 907, 908 (1981)	Presented as a contrasting authority.	Cited by way of contrast; the opinion does not elaborate further on Kintner's factual or legal specifics.
Borman v. Borman, 378 Mass. 775, 779-780 (1979)	Referenced in connection with the policy underlying exhaustion of administrative remedies.	Referred to by way of comparison to explain that exhaustion concerns do not defeat enforcement in the circumstances presented.
Mancuso v. Mancuso, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 395, 401 n.6 (1980)	Discusses "unusual instances where appellate review on an interlocutory basis is authorized by law."	Cited in a footnote to state the court did not need to decide whether interlocutory appellate review was authorized here.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began with the statutory mandate: G.L. c. 152, § 11 requires the Superior Court to enforce § 8 orders of single members of the Industrial Accident Board. Relying on Assuncao's Case (and Czarniak's Case), the court explained that the enforcement proceeding exists to provide the employee the power to compel performance of the board's orders — a power the board itself lacks. Because of that statutory purpose, the judge in the Superior Court had no discretion to refuse enforcement of a single member's payment order, even though the insurer had appealed to the board's reviewing panel under § 10. The court rejected applying the general policy of administrative exhaustion to deny enforcement here, noting that the "sole purpose [of a court order of enforcement] is to maintain a status in favor of the employee, pending the final resolution of the proceedings before the board." The court further observed that the Superior Court judge's refusal was therefore contrary to the statutory mandate and that the refusal was immediately appealable. In a footnote the court added that it need not decide whether interlocutory appellate review would otherwise be available and noted an alternative faster remedy (application to a single justice under G.L. c. 231, § 118), but did not rely on those points to reach its holding.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Superior Court judge erred; the judge had no discretion to deny enforcement of the single member's G.L. c. 152, § 8 order directing payment, and the refusal was immediately appealable. The case is remanded to the Superior Court for entry of an order enforcing the payment order of the single member.

Implications: The direct effect is that the Superior Court must enter an order enforcing the single member's payment order. The opinion applies existing statutory authority and prior decisions to require enforcement and does not announce a novel rule beyond those authorities cited.

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MARINO BIAGINI'S CASE.

Workmen's Compensation Act, Enforcement of order by Superior Court, Exhaustion of administrative remedies.

In an employee's proceeding under G.L.c. 152, § 11, the judge in the Superior Court had no discretion to deny enforcement of an order by a single member of the Industrial Accident Board directing payment of workers' compensation, which the insurer had appealed to the agency's reviewing board. [104]

BROWN, J.

The employee has taken an appeal from a "judgment" of the Superior Court denying enforcement of a decision under G.L.c. 152, § 8, of a single member of the Industrial Accident Board (board). The judge erred.

We summarize the proceedings below. The employee filed a claim for workers' compensation with the board because of injuries alleged to have arisen out of and in the course of his employment. After a conference held before a single member of the board pursuant to the provisions of G.L.c. 152, § 7, an order denying payment was filed. Another single member, after a hearing requested by the employee pursuant to G.L.c. 152, §§ 7 8, ordered payment of compensation. The insurer sought review under G.L.c. 152, § 10. Before the case was heard by the reviewing board, the employee filed a certified copy of the single member's order with the Superior Court, seeking judicial enforcement. See G.L.c. 152, § 11. A judge of the Superior Court refused to order compliance.

Section 11 of c. 152 mandates that § 8 orders are to be enforced by the Superior Court. The purpose of an enforcement proceeding is "to give the employee the benefit of a power which the board cannot offer" the "power to compel performance of its orders or those of its members." Assuncao's Case, 372 Mass. 6, 10 (1977). Czarniak's Case, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 467, 469 (1982). The judge had no discretion to refuse so to order. In the particular circumstances presented here the judge's action is contrary to the statutory mandate and is immediately appealable. See Seymour's Case, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 935 (1978). Contrast Kintner's Case, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 907, 908 (1981). The policy underlying exhaustion of the administrative process does not come into play here, where the "sole purpose [of a court order of enforcement] is to maintain a status in favor of the employee, pending the final resolution of the proceedings before the board." Assuncao's Case, supra. Cf. Borman v. Borman, 378 Mass. 775, 779-780 (1979).

As we hold that this matter was immediately appealable, we have no occasion to discuss whether this case presents one of those "unusual instances where appellate review on an interlocutory basis is authorized by law." Mancuso v. Mancuso, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 395, 401 n. 6 (1980). Notwithstanding what we have just said, we would be remiss if we were not to point out that the relief sought here would have been more quickly obtainable from a single justice of this court pursuant to G.L.c. 231, § 118, first par.

The case is remanded to the Superior Court for entry of an order enforcing the payment order of the single member.

So ordered.

BIAGINI'S CASE