Case Summary: IN RE R. K. J. (Court of Appeals of Georgia, May 15, 1986)

Factual and Procedural Background

Via petition, R.K.J., age 14, was alleged to be a delinquent child for taking $215 from Mary Polite on July 13, 1985, with the intention of depriving her of the money. After a adjudicatory hearing in Dougherty Juvenile Court (before Judge Black), the juvenile court found R.K.J. to be a delinquent child. The juvenile court placed him on probation for one year, ordered restitution, ordered him to participate in the Saturday Work Program and to attend the Laws of Living course, and ordered his parents to pay $178 for Laws of Living services. R.K.J. appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile court's finding that R.K.J. was a delinquent child (i.e., that he participated in a theft).
Whether the juvenile court erred in considering the parents' income in determining that R.K.J. was not indigent for purposes of receiving a free transcript.
Whether the juvenile court erred by ordering R.K.J.'s parents to pay $178 for Laws of Living services without a separate hearing concerning their financial ability to pay, pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-56(b).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The evidence was not sufficient to support the finding that he was a delinquent child.
The court erred in taking his parents' income into consideration when determining indigency and in refusing to provide a free transcript.
The court erred by ordering his parents to pay $178 for Laws of Living services without affording them a hearing regarding their financial ability to pay, as required by OCGA § 15-11-56(b).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Parham v. State, 166 Ga. App. 855, 856 (305 S.E.2d 599)	Establishes that mere presence at the scene of a crime does not constitute sufficient evidence of guilt.	The court cited Parham to recognize that presence alone is insufficient but that other circumstances may support an inference of participation.
Jones v. State, 242 Ga. 893 (252 S.E.2d 394)	“Presence, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense are circumstances from which one's participation in the criminal intent may be inferred.”	The court relied on this principle to conclude that R.K.J.'s conduct and companionship before and after the offense supported a finding of participation.
Thornton v. State, 119 Ga. 437 (46 S.E. 640)	Quoted as supporting the rule quoted in Jones regarding inference of participation from presence, companionship, and conduct.	Served as the historical source for the quoted rule used to evaluate inference of intent.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560)	Standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence: whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.	The court invoked Jackson v. Virginia to conclude the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find R.K.J. committed the delinquent act beyond a reasonable doubt.
J. B. v. State, 171 Ga. App. 373, 375 (3) (319 S.E.2d 465)	Permits consideration of parents' income when determining a juvenile's indigency; the juvenile court's determination of ability to pay is final and not subject to review.	The court relied on J. B. v. State to justify considering the parents' income and to support that the court's determination concerning ability to pay the transcript costs was final.
Croy v. State, 168 Ga. App. 562, 564 (3) (309 S.E.2d 841)	Principle that arguments not raised in the trial court cannot be considered for the first time on appeal.	The court cited Croy to support refusal to consider appellant's challenge to the lack of a separate hearing on Laws of Living fees, because no objection was made below.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court summarized the factual evidence: R.K.J. and two other children were together, discussed taking money, had a plan to get a potential witness to leave by giving her money, and R.L. removed cash from the register while R.K.J. and another observed. The group later retrieved and divided the money at R.K.J.'s house; R.K.J. received $25 and later returned a portion of the money to the station manager and explained the plan.

Applying OCGA § 16-2-20(a) and (b)(3) (that every person concerned in the commission of a crime may be charged and that one is concerned only if he intentionally aids or abets), and OCGA § 16-2-6 (that intent may be inferred from words, conduct, demeanor, motive, and other circumstances), the court concluded that the combination of R.K.J.'s presence, companionship with the other participants, and conduct before and after the theft permitted an inference of participation and intent. The court acknowledged the rule (from Parham) that mere presence is insufficient, but relied on the Jones/Thornton principle that presence plus companionship and conduct may support conviction.

For the sufficiency-of-evidence review, the court applied the Jackson v. Virginia standard and found the evidence adequate for a rational trier of fact to find the delinquent act beyond a reasonable doubt.

On the indigency/transcript issue, the court applied OCGA § 15-11-56 and J. B. v. State to hold that it was proper to consider the parents' income in determining the juvenile's indigency and that the juvenile court's determination as to ability to pay was final and not subject to review.

Regarding the challenge to the order that the parents pay $178 for Laws of Living services, the court observed (1) that a hearing about the parents' financial status had effectively occurred when the court considered indigency for the transcript and found the parents able to pay, (2) that the appellant and his parents were not harmed by the lack of a separate hearing as to Laws of Living fees, and (3) that no objection was made in the juvenile court when the parents were ordered to pay, so the argument was not preserved for appeal under Croy v. State.

Holding and Implications

Judgment affirmed.

Direct effects on the parties: The juvenile court's adjudication of R.K.J. as a delinquent child and its disposition (one-year probation, restitution, participation in Saturday Work Program and Laws of Living course, and an order that the parents pay $178 for Laws of Living services) were affirmed. The court upheld the sufficiency of the evidence, affirmed the juvenile court's consideration of the parents' income in denying a free transcript, and rejected the challenge to the assessment of Laws of Living costs due to lack of objection and because a financial inquiry had been conducted. The opinion does not announce or establish any broader new precedent beyond applying existing statutes and cited case law to the facts of this case.

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IN RE R. K. J.

McMURRAY, Presiding Judge.

Via petition, R. K. J., a 14-years-old child, was alleged to be a delinquent child. It was alleged that on July 13, 1985, R. K. J. took $215 from Mary Polite with the intention of depriving her of the money. Following a hearing, the juvenile court determined that R. K. J. was a delinquent child. He was placed on probation for one year, ordered to make restitution, work in the Saturday Work Program, and attend the Laws of Living course. His parents were ordered to pay $178 for Laws of Living services and he now appeals. Held:

1. R. K. J. contends the evidence was not sufficient to support the court's finding that he was a delinquent child. The evidence demonstrated that on the day in question, R. K. J. and two other children (R. L. and S.W.) were at the home of S.W., one of the two other children; that the children left S.W.'s house and walked to a service station which they frequented; that on the way to the service station, S.W. was "nicking" R. K. J. (who had approximately two dollars) for some money; that R. L. brought up the idea of taking money from the service station; that both R. K. J. and S.W. responded to the idea (S.W. answering "yeah, yeah man"); that once inside the service station it became necessary to get a potential witness to leave; that R. L. took one dollar from R. K. J. and gave it to the potential witness so she would leave; that when a limousine pulled up to the service station the attendants went outside leaving R. K. J., S.W. and R. L. alone; that R. L. took more money than was alleged in the petition (since the balance was recovered) from the cash register while R. K. J. and S.W. "just looked out"; that R. L. hid the money under a dumpster; that later in the day R. L., S.W. and S.W.'s brother retrieved the money and brought it to R. K. J.'s house; that the money was divided in R. K. J.'s room and he received $25; and that, thereafter, R. K. J., S.W. and R. L. used some of the money to buy hats and a pizza. The evidence also demonstrated that toward the evening hours R. K. J. went back to the service station in the company of his mother and his aunt; that he returned a portion of the money to the manager of the station; that he told the manager that "they had planned this here by giving [the potential witness] . . . a dollar or two for her to leave the station in order for them to catch [the manager] with [his] back turned going outside."

OCGA § 16-2-20 (a) provides that "[e]very person concerned in the commission of a crime is a party thereto and may be charged with and convicted of commission of the crime." A person is "concerned in the commission of a crime only if he. . . [i]ntentionally aids or abets in the commission of the crime. . ." OCGA § 16-2-20 (b) (3). Of course, mere presence at the scene of a crime does not constitute sufficient evidence of guilt. Parham v. State, 166 Ga. App. 855, 856 ( 305 S.E.2d 599). However, "`presence, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense are circumstances from which one's participation in the criminal intent may be inferred.'" Jones v. State, 242 Ga. 893 ( 252 S.E.2d 394) (quoting Thornton v. State, 119 Ga. 437 ( 46 S.E. 640)). See Parham v. State, 166 Ga. App. 855, 856, supra. Moreover, "the trier of facts may find such intention upon consideration of the words, conduct, demeanor, motive, and all other circumstances connected with the act for which the accused is prosecuted." OCGA § 16-2-6.

We think the conduct and companionship of R. K. J. Before and after the delinquent act adequately demonstrated his participation in the act. The evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find he committed the delinquent act (theft by taking were he an adult) beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560).

2. Following the adjudication, R. K. J., alleging he was an indigent, sought a free copy of the transcript. Upon considering the income and expenditures of R. K. J.'s family, the court determined that R. K. J. did not meet the standards of indigency and the court refused to provide him with a free transcript. R. K. J. contends the court erred by taking the income of his parents into consideration; he also contends the court erred by determining his family's income did not meet the criteria of indigency. These contentions are without merit. Since R. K. J. is a juvenile, it was proper for the court to consider his parents' income when the court made the decision concerning his financial status. See OCGA § 15-11-56; J. B. v. State, 171 Ga. App. 373, 375 (3) ( 319 S.E.2d 465). Furthermore, the court's determination concerning the ability of R. K. J. to pay for the transcript was final and not subject to review. J. B. v. State, 171 Ga. App. 373, 375, supra.

3. R. K. J. contends the court erred by ordering his parents to pay $178 for the services provided by the Laws of Living program. In this regard, he complains that his parents were not afforded a hearing concerning their financial ability to pay these costs. See OCGA § 15-11-56 (b). Assuming, arguendo, R. K. J. has standing to raise this issue, we find it to be without merit. First, we note that a hearing was held concerning the financial status of his parents when he sought a free transcript and the court determined that they were financially able to pay their son's costs. We fail to see how R. K. J. and his parents were harmed by the fact that no similar hearing was held concerning the Laws of Living expenses. Second, no objection along these lines was made in the juvenile court when the court announced that the parents would be required to pay the $178 costs. It is axiomatic that we cannot consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal. Croy v. State, 168 Ga. App. 562, 564 (3) ( 309 S.E.2d 841).

Judgment affirmed. Carley and Pope, JJ., concur.

DECIDED MAY 15, 1986.

IN RE R. K. J