Appeal from so much of the order entered April 23, 1985, as denied the defendant's motion for reargument dismissed. No appeal lies from an order denying reargument (Ginsberg v. Ginsberg, 104 A.D.2d 482).
Order entered April 23, 1985, otherwise affirmed.
Order dated August 20, 1985, affirmed and order dated October 22, 1985, affirmed insofar as appealed from.
Judgment entered February 19, 1985, affirmed.
The plaintiff is awarded one bill of costs.
Special Term correctly found that the plaintiff's complaint was sufficient to withstand that branch of the defendant's motion which was to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action (see, Bulger v. Bulger, 88 A.D.2d 895).
In addition, we find that the court had before it sufficient evidence to determine with reasonable certainty that the defendant had violated the stay provision of an order to show cause signed by Justice Ferraro (see, Pereira v. Pereira, 35 N.Y.2d 301, 308). In finding no proof of actual damage or loss suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the defendant's actions, the court has still within its statutory authority to impose a fine as well as to assess counsel fees (see, Hardwood Dimension Mouldings v. Consolidated Edison Co., 77 A.D.2d 644, appeal dismissed 51 N.Y.2d 1008, cross appeal dismissed 54 N.Y.2d 680).
Finally, on the record before us, we do not find that Special Term abused its discretion in denying that branch of the defendant's motion which was to modify the award of temporary maintenance and child support (cf. Romanoff v. Romanoff, 111 A.D.2d 158). In view of the fact that the action has apparently been placed on the Trial Calendar, we note that the appropriate remedy for a pendente lite award claimed to be unsatisfactory is an expeditious trial at which a more detailed examination of the parties' situations may be made (see, Rossman v. Rossman, 91 A.D.2d 1036; Chachkes v. Chachkes, 107 A.D.2d 786). Mollen, P.J., Thompson, Rubin and Lawrence, JJ., concur.