Order and judgment affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs to the defendant Time Moving and Storage.
The plaintiff was an employee of Time Moving and Storage at the time of the accident. He was a passenger in a vehicle which had been leased by his employer, and which was driven by a coemployee at the time of the accident. Trial Term properly granted summary judgment to Time Moving and Storage on the ground that the Workers' Compensation Law provided the plaintiff's exclusive remedy. The plaintiff was clearly barred from suing his employer, by virtue of the Workers' Compensation Law. Further, the summary judgment motion of the defendant Spencer-Cameron Leasing Corp. was properly granted on the basis that the Workers' Compensation Law is the exclusive remedy when an employee is a passenger in a vehicle driven by a coemployee and is injured by the coemployee's negligence, and no active negligence is alleged against the owner of the vehicle (see, Naso v. Lafata, 4 N.Y.2d 585; Rauch v Jones, 4 N.Y.2d 592).
Trial Term did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's cross motion to amend his complaint and bill of particulars to change the theory of his case nearly four years after inception of the lawsuit and after all discovery had been completed (see, McCaskey, Davies Assoc. v. New York City Health Hosps. Corp., 59 N.Y.2d 755; Wyso v. City of New York, 91 A.D.2d 661; Woodhouse, Drake Carey v. Anderson, 61 Misc.2d 951). Lazer, J.P., Mangano, Lawrence and Eiber, JJ., concur.