Appeal from the order dated October 7, 1985, dismissed, without costs or disbursements. No appeal lies from an order denying reargument (see, e.g., Fahey v County of Nassau, 111 A.D.2d 214; Amity Plumbing Heating Supply Corp. v Zito Plumbing Heating Corp., 110 A.D.2d 863).
Order dated May 31, 1985, reversed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements, and that branch of the third-party defendants' motion which was to dismiss the third-party complaint denied.
The third-party defendants concede that Special Term erred in finding that no claim for contribution could be asserted against them because they were successive and independent tort-feasors (see, Schauer v Joyce, 54 N.Y.2d 1, 5). Special Term's reliance upon Bergan v Home for Incurables ( 75 A.D.2d 762) and Zillman v Meadowbrook Hosp. Co. ( 45 A.D.2d 267) is misplaced. Those cases stand for the proposition that a successive tort-feasor may not seek apportionment of damages from a prior tort-feasor because successive tort-feasors are only responsible for the aggravation of the original injury caused by their conduct. At bar, the appellant, as the first tort-feasor, is liable for the entire injury, and there is ample basis upon the pleadings for holding that the alleged tortious conduct of both the appellant and the third-party defendants was responsible for the plaintiff's injury (see, Helmrich v Lilly Co., 89 A.D.2d 441; Wiseman v 374 Realty Corp., 54 A.D.2d 119).
We further find that the third-party complaint satisfies the basic pleading requirements of CPLR 3013 (see, Grcic v Peninsula Hosp. Center, 110 A.D.2d 625; Torres v Southside Hosp., 84 A.D.2d 836). Mollen, P.J., Lazer, Thompson and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.