PER CURIAM.
This is an interlocutory appeal from a venue determination by the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, 601 F. Supp. 170 (1985). We consider only the single question that the district court certified for our review: Whether the plaintiffs can bring suit against the United States in Colorado as residents of that state under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), 1402(b) (1982). The plaintiffs' principal place of business is in Colorado, but they are incorporated respectively in New York and Delaware.
After reviewing the briefs and hearing oral argument, we join the view of other circuits and hold that the residence of a plaintiff corporation under those statutes is limited to the state of incorporation; it does not include other states where it may do business or have its principal place of business. See Rosenfeld v. S.F.C. Corp., 702 F.2d 282, 283 (1st Cir. 1983); Reuben H. Donnelley Corp. v. FTC, 580 F.2d 264, 269-70 (7th Cir. 1978); Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology Associates, Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1289 (9th Cir. 1977); American Cyanamid Co. v. Hammond Lead Products, Inc., 495 F.2d 1183, 1184-87 (3d Cir. 1974); Manchester Modes, Inc. v. Schuman, 426 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1970); Carter-Beveridge Drilling Co. v. Hughes, 323 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1963); Robert E. Lee Co. v. Veatch, 301 F.2d 434, 435-38 (4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 813, 83 S.Ct. 23, 9 L.Ed.2d 55 (1962). Moreover, we hold that 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1982) does not affect this determination because that subsection applies only to corporate defendants, not to corporate plaintiffs. See, e.g., Rosenfeld, 702 F.2d at 283.
Accordingly, the district court's contrary decision is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.