Resentences affirmed.
When this matter was originally before us, we vacated the sentences because of the confusion at their imposition, but otherwise affirmed the judgment. Thus, the matter was remitted solely for the purpose of clarifying what sentences had been imposed (see, People v Semkus, 109 A.D.2d 902). That has now been accomplished.
We reject the defendant's contention that the imposition of consecutive sentences for the crimes of criminal possession of stolen property in the first degree and attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree was improper since the firearm which was the subject of the weapons charge was not among the items of stolen property for which the defendant was convicted. Consecutive sentences may be imposed for distinct criminal acts (Penal Law § 70.25; People v Brathwaite, 63 N.Y.2d 839).
The defendant's further contentions with respect to the legality of his sentences are also without merit. The sentencing court is not bound by the recommendation contained in the presentence report (see, People v Arogundy, 112 A.D.2d 1003). Codefendants need not be sentenced equally (see, People v Danny G., 61 N.Y.2d 169, 175; People v Jones, 39 N.Y.2d 694), and there is ample reason on this record to sentence the defendant differently than his codefendants. The sentencing court is under no obligation, in the absence of special circumstances not present here (see, North Carolina v Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 726), to explain its decision (see, CPL 380.50; United States v Vasquez, 638 F.2d 507).
Finally, the sentences imposed were not an abuse of discretion and the circumstances do not warrant our substituting our own discretion for that of the sentencing court (see, People v Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80). Lazer, J.P., Bracken, Brown, Lawrence and Kooper, JJ., concur.