Judgment affirmed.
The defendant urges for the first time on appeal that the delay between his arrest and the commencement of trial violated his right to a speedy trial pursuant to CPL 30.20 and 30.30. Crim. Proc. As the defendant failed to raise either the constitutional claim (CPL 30.20) or the statutory speedy trial claim (CPL 30.30) in the court of first instance, the issues have been waived (see, People v Lawrence, 64 N.Y.2d 200; People v Jordan, 62 N.Y.2d 825; People v Adams, 38 N.Y.2d 605; People v White, 32 N.Y.2d 393; People v Ruiz, 107 A.D.2d 770).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a "`rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt'" (People v Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621, quoting from Jackson v Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319; see, People v Herriot, 110 A.D.2d 851, 852).
Lastly, the defendant's claim that he was denied effective assistance of counsel is without merit since the record reflects that defense counsel was competent and provided meaningful representation to the defendant (see, People v Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137, 146-147; People v Satterfield, 66 N.Y.2d 796; People v Morris, 100 A.D.2d 630, affd 64 N.Y.2d 803; People v Levy, 118 A.D.2d 804). Mollen, P.J., Thompson, Brown and Rubin, JJ.