Judgment affirmed.
We reject the defendant's contention that the instant prosecution for intentional murder was barred by the statutory prohibition against double jeopardy embodied in CPL 40.20. The record indicates that the decedent, the defendant's wife, died several days after the defendant entered a plea of guilty to first degree assault in connection with the shooting of the same individual. Since the defendant's wife died subsequent to the prosecution of the defendant for an offense resulting in physical injury to the decedent, the People were free to prosecute the defendant for murder (see, CPL 40.20 [b]; CPL 40.30 [a]; People v Rivera, 60 N.Y.2d 110; Matter of Peter v King, 81 A.D.2d 672, lv denied 53 N.Y.2d 609).
Moreover, we conclude that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the People (see, People v Malizia, 62 N.Y.2d 755, cert denied 469 U.S. 932), was sufficient to prove the defendant guilty of intentional murder beyond a reasonable doubt (see, People v Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620). Indeed, the defendant expressed a desire to kill his wife one or two weeks prior to the shooting, and on the day of the offense, he lured her to the scene of the crime and then fired a shot from a .16 gauge shotgun into her abdomen from a distance of one to two feet. Hence, we discern no basis for disturbing the jury's verdict (see generally, People v Mathure, 111 A.D.2d 876; People v Rosenfeld, 93 A.D.2d 872). Lazer, J.P., Mangano, Brown and Weinstein, JJ., concur.