Per Curiam.
This appeal involves four proceedings pursuant to Election Law § 16-102 either to validate or invalidate certain designating petitions. Special Term dismissed the proceedings as untimely. We affirm.
The last day to commence these proceedings was July 24, 1986. On that date, orders to show cause commencing the proceedings were obtained, purportedly authorizing certain alternative methods of service on the various respondents, including mailing on or before July 24, 1986. Petitioners attempted service on certain of the respondents by ordinary mail on July 24, 1986.
The method of service directed in an order to show cause must be reasonably calculated to give notice to the necessary parties so that receipt of such notice would normally be expected within the statutory 14-day period for commencing a proceeding concerning the validity of a designating petition (Matter of Contessa v McCarthy, 40 N.Y.2d 890, 891; Matter of Butler v Hayduk, 37 N.Y.2d 497, 498). Thus, even when the Board of Elections is properly and timely served, mailing alone of the order to show cause and petition to other necessary parties on the last day allowed by law to institute such a proceeding is untimely and improper (Matter of Radda v Acito, 54 A.D.2d 531; see also, Matter of Moore v Milhim, 109 A.D.2d 810; Matter of Floyd v Coveney, 83 A.D.2d 897).
Matter of Pell v Coveney ( 37 N.Y.2d 494), upon which petitioners rely, is distinguishable, for the Board's delay in issuing its determination herein until after the last day for commencing a proceeding did not cause the proceeding to be untimely. Rather, petitioners actually attempted to commence the proceedings within the statutory time limit; the proceedings were untimely due to the inadequate method of service.
Orders and judgment affirmed, without costs. Mahoney, P.J., Kane, Casey and Weiss, JJ., concur.