Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The identification evidence was sufficient to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (see, People v Herriot, 110 A.D.2d 851). The evidence showed that the victim saw the defendant's face for 10 minutes while he and his accomplice were searching her room and that she saw his partially covered face for an additional five minutes during the rape. There was nothing about this testimony which would indicate that it was so unreliable that reversal is required (cf. People v McCann, 101 A.D.2d 843; People v Crudup, 100 A.D.2d 938).
While it is true that the testimony elicited by the prosecutor concerning the description of the defendant's best friend was of slight probative value, we cannot conclude that this evidence was so prejudicial that admitting it into evidence was an abuse of discretion (see, People v Feldman, 299 N.Y. 153; cf. People v Mountain, 66 N.Y.2d 197). We also have concluded that the comments of the prosecutor made during summation which did not accurately describe the evidence at trial did not deny the defendant a fair trial (see, People v Galloway, 54 N.Y.2d 396; People v Roopchand, 107 A.D.2d 35, affd 65 N.Y.2d 837).
Finally, given the seriousness of the crime of which the defendant was convicted and the lenient sentence imposed, we find no abuse of discretion in the sentencing court's denial of youthful offender status (see, People v Jordan, 115 A.D.2d 622; People v Ortega, 114 A.D.2d 912). Brown, J.P., Weinstein, Lawrence and Kooper, JJ., concur.