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Docket Number

No. 8629SC543

Attorney(S)

Attorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Associate Attorney General James A. Wellons, for the State. Appellate Defender Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., by Assistant Appellate Defender Robin E. Hudson, for defendant, appellant.

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Smart Summary

State of North Carolina v. Oral Eubanks, No. 8629SC543 — Court of Appeals (Filed 18 Nov 1986)

Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals

Docket: No. 8629SC543

Filed: 18 November 1986

Trial judge / lower court judgment: Appeal from judgment entered 15 November 1985 in Superior Court, Henderson County, before Judge C. Walter Allen.

Counsel: Attorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Associate Attorney General James A. Wellons, for the State; Appellate Defender Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., by Assistant Appellate Defender Robin E. Hudson, for defendant, appellant.

Factual and Procedural Background

The defendant, Oral Eubanks, was indicted for second degree arson in violation of G.S. 14-58. Following trial, he was found guilty as charged and sentenced to a twelve-year prison term. The judgment was entered 15 November 1985 in Superior Court, Henderson County, and the defendant appealed. The appeal was heard in the Court of Appeals on 29 October 1986.

Evidence presented at trial, as summarized by the Court of Appeals, tended to show that the house in question belonged to Cynthia Williams, who lived there. Testimony established that the house was burned and that the fire resulted from an incendiary act rather than an accidental cause (as testified by a State Bureau of Investigation arson investigator). The house was unoccupied at the time of the burning. The Court recited statements attributed to the defendant: he told Jim Smith (who also lived at the house) to remove his personal belongings and warned Smith that "it was going to be set afire," told Smith on the day of the fire "we're going to do it tonight," and after the fire when asked "How did it go?" responded "K-WOOOSH." Based on this evidence, the court evaluated the sufficiency of proof for second degree arson.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support a conviction for second degree arson under G.S. 14-58 (i.e., whether the State proved each element of second degree arson such that the case could properly be submitted to the jury).

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
State v. White, 291 N.C. 118, 229 S.E.2d 152 (1976)	Defines "willful and malicious" burning: act must be voluntary and without excuse or bona fide claim of right; no intent against the property or owner is required.	The court used White to explain that for arson the prosecution need only show a voluntary burning without excuse or claim of right, not an intent to harm the owner or the property beyond the burning itself.
State v. Oxendine, 305 N.C. 126, 286 S.E.2d 546 (1982)	Holds that the "burning" element requires that some portion of the dwelling itself be burned.	The court cited Oxendine to confirm that the State must show that part of the dwelling was burned; the opinion notes that the house was burned, satisfying this requirement.
State v. Vickers, 306 N.C. 90, 291 S.E.2d 599 (1982)	Explains that a house constitutes a "dwelling house" if someone lives there.	The court relied on Vickers when considering whether the structure was a dwelling house, noting testimony that Cynthia Williams lived in the house.
State v. Shaw, 305 N.C. 327, 289 S.E.2d 325 (1982)	Explains that a dwelling is "of another" if someone other than the defendant lives there.	The court used Shaw's principle to confirm that the house was the dwelling of another because occupants other than the defendant lived there.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by stating the statutory and common-law definitions relevant to arson. It noted that arson at common law is the willful and malicious burning of the dwelling house of another, and under G.S. 14-58 an unoccupied dwelling at the time of burning constitutes second degree arson.

Applying its cited authorities, the court analyzed the constituent elements:

Willful and malicious: Citing State v. White, the court observed that "willful and malicious" means the act was done voluntarily and without excuse or a bona fide claim of right; no specific animus toward the owner or property is required.
Burning: Relying on State v. Oxendine, the court required that some portion of the dwelling itself be burned; the evidence showed the house was burned.
Dwelling house and "of another": Citing State v. Vickers and State v. Shaw, the court confirmed that because someone (Cynthia Williams) lived in the house and the occupants were other than the defendant, it qualified as the dwelling of another.

The court then recited the trial evidence relevant to these elements: ownership and occupancy by Cynthia Williams, the SBI arson investigator's testimony that the fire was incendiary rather than accidental, the defendant's prior warnings to Jim Smith to remove belongings because the house "was going to be set afire," the defendant's statement on the day of the fire "we're going to do it tonight," and the defendant's post-fire remark "K-WOOOSH" when asked how it went. The court also noted that the house was unoccupied at the moment of burning (consistent with second degree arson under G.S. 14-58).

Concluding this analysis, the court held that the State introduced sufficient evidence on each requisite element of second degree arson to warrant submission of the case to the jury and to support the conviction.

Holding and Implications

NO ERROR — Conviction Affirmed.

Holding: The Court of Appeals found no error in the trial court's judgment and held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for second degree arson. The defendant's twelve-year sentence, imposed by the Superior Court, therefore stands.

Implications: The decision directly upholds the jury's verdict and the imposed sentence in this case. The opinion does not announce or rely upon any new legal rule or broader change in precedent; it applies established North Carolina authorities to the facts and affirms that the evidence as summarized was sufficient to sustain a conviction for second degree arson.

Judges Martin and Cozort concurred with Chief Judge Hedrick's opinion.

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STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ORAL EUBANKS

Arson 4.1 — second degree arson — sufficiency of evidence Evidence was sufficient to be submitted to the jury in a prosecution for second degree arson where it tended to show that the house belonged to a named person who lived there, but it was unoccupied at the time of the burning; the fire was the result of an incendiary act; and defendant told an occupant of the house that he should remove his personal belongings because the house was going to be set on fire, warned the occupant on the day of the fire, and reported how the burning had gone after the deed was done.

Defendant was charged in a proper bill of indictment with second degree arson, in violation of G.S. 14-58. He was found guilty as charged. From a judgment imposing a prison sentence of twelve years, defendant appealed.

HEDRICK, Chief Judge.

The only assignment of error defendant argues in his brief is that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction for second degree arson. Arson is defined at the common law as the willful and malicious burning of the dwelling house of another person. Under G.S. 14-58, if the dwelling burned was unoccupied at the time of the burning, the offense is arson in the second degree.

For a burning to be "willful and malicious" in the law of arson, it must simply be done voluntarily and without excuse or justification and without any bona fide claim of right. An intent or animus against either the property itself or its owner is not required. State v. White, 291 N.C. 118, 229 S.E.2d 152 (1976).

The "burning" element requires that some portion of the dwelling itself be burned. State v. Oxendine, 305 N.C. 126, 286 S.E.2d 546 (1982). The house is a "dwelling house" if someone lives there. State v. Vickers, 306 N.C. 90, 291 S.E.2d 599 (1982). It is the dwelling house "of another" if someone other than the defendant lives there. State v. Shaw, 305 N.C. 327, 289 S.E.2d 325 (1982).

In the present case, evidence was presented tending to show the following: The house belonged to Cynthia Williams, who lived there. The house was burned. The fire was the result of an incendiary act, and not an accidental cause, according to the testimony of a State Bureau of Investigation arson investigator. Defendant had told Jim Smith, who also lived there, that he had to get his "clothes and stuff out" and "find a place to stay" because "it was going to be set afire." Defendant told Mr. Smith on the day of the fire, "we're going to do it tonight." Later that night, after the house had burned, Mr. Smith asked defendant, "How did it go?" referring to the fire. Defendant answered "K-WOOOSH." The house was unoccupied at the time of the burning. We hold that the State introduced sufficient evidence of each element of second degree arson to support the conviction.

No error.

Judges MARTIN and COZORT concur.

STATE v. EUBANKS