Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contentions on appeal, the record discloses that the People met her claimed defense of justification with ample evidence tending to establish that the stabbing involved was not justifiable. At trial, the People produced a police witness through whom the prosecutor elicited the defendant's incriminatory postarrest account of the stabbing which differed materially from her exculpatory trial testimony regarding the incident. The defendant's admissions, accordingly, formed the evidentiary basis from which the trier of fact could rationally conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was not, in fact, faced with deadly force immediately prior to her fatal stabbing of the victim and that her own use of deadly force was, therefore, unjustified (see, Penal Law § 35.15; cf. People v. Hanley, 112 A.D.2d 1048, 1049; People v Boute, 111 A.D.2d 398, 399).
The defendant further contends that the People did not prove her sanity beyond a reasonable doubt (see, Penal Law former § 30.05 [now § 40.15]; Penal Law § 25.00; People v Silver, 33 N.Y.2d 475). We do not agree. It is the general rule that where conflicting testimony is presented the question of sanity is for the trier of fact, which has the right to accept or reject the opinion of any expert (see, People v. Wood, 12 N.Y.2d 69, 77; People v. Buthy, 38 A.D.2d 10, 12-13). Here, the trier of fact could have properly inferred from the conflicting evidence that the defendant was criminally responsible for her conduct when the crime in question was committed (see, People v. Wood, supra, at p 77; People v. Breeden, 115 A.D.2d 484). Where, as at bar, there is an absence of a serious flaw in the testimony of the People's expert, the determination of the trier of facts on the issue of sanity will not be disturbed (see, People v Robertson, 123 A.D.2d 795; People v. Amaya, 122 A.D.2d 888; People v. Jandelli, 118 A.D.2d 656; People v. Bell, 64 A.D.2d 785). Mollen, P.J., Brown, Niehoff and Kooper, JJ., concur.