Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's arrest was properly predicated on probable cause. Although the informant was not a "disinterested public-spirited citizen", her reliability could still be established (see, People v. Rodriguez, 52 N.Y.2d 483, 489), since her information constituted an admission against her own penal interest (see, People v. Comforto, 62 N.Y.2d 725). In contrast to People v. Johnson ( 66 N.Y.2d 398), the informant admitted to being in possession of a .25 caliber automatic pistol, which she lent to the defendant knowing it would be used to "make some money"; this makes out a case against her of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree (see, Penal Law § 265.01), and certainly constitutes evidence of criminal facilitation in the fourth degree (see, Penal Law § 5.00). Moreover, the information was to some degree corroborated by information already known to the police about the crime (see, People v Rodriguez, supra).
As the informant's statement was based upon personal knowledge, the basis-of-knowledge prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test is satisfied (see, People v. Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d 398, 403, supra).
Nor did the hearing court err in concluding that the defendant's confession should not be suppressed as involuntary. "[T]he People are required to come forward and explain the existence of injuries on a defendant only in cases where the injuries are objectively verifiable and where they are consistent with the defendant's claim of police brutality" (People v Sommer, 34 A.D.2d 817). Here, the medical evidence submitted did not bear out the defendant's claim.
We have reviewed the defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Mangano, J.P., Weinstein, Lawrence and Kooper, JJ., concur.