Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Under the circumstances of this case and in view of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt, the brief reference to the defendant's postarrest silence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (see, People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 237). Moreover, the remarks objected to by the defendant in the prosecutor's summation constituted a fair response to defense counsel's summation and were therefore not improper (see, People v. Colon, 122 A.D.2d 151; People v. Saylor, 115 A.D.2d 671, lv denied 67 N.Y.2d 889; People v. Gilmore, 106 A.D.2d 399, 401).
Since the defendant did not demonstrate the necessity for the appointment of a fingerprint expert on his behalf under County Law § 722-c, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his request to appoint such expert (see, Johnson v Harris, 682 F.2d 49, 50, cert denied 459 U.S. 1041; People v Pride, 79 Misc.2d 581). Further, the trial court did not act improperly when it ordered the defendant to be fingerprinted (see, CPL 240.40 [b] [iii]) and when it admitted the unsigned arrest fingerprint samples of the defendant, which were found to be identical to the defendant's fingerprints taken at trial (cf. People v. Pabon, 120 A.D.2d 685).
Neither denial of youthful offender status by the sentencing court (see, People v. Selg, 110 A.D.2d 918; People v. Parris, 109 A.D.2d 853) nor the sentence imposed (see, People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80) was inappropriate. The defendant's remaining arguments are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Mangano, J.P., Brown, Weinstein and Spatt, JJ., concur.