Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The complaint sufficiently alleges that the written agreement established the intent of the parties to contract for the sale of real property, such that specific performance may be had (see, Brause v. Goldman, 10 A.D.2d 328, 332, affd 9 N.Y.2d 620). Furthermore, Special Term properly found that the agreement, containing all of the essential elements of the transaction, was sufficient to overcome the Statute of Frauds (see, McLean v. Kessler, 103 Misc.2d 553; cf., Rodman v Aivagedis, 123 A.D.2d 429; Read v. Henzel, 67 A.D.2d 186). That the agreement made no reference to a mortgage does not mandate a contrary result (see, Lashway v. Sorell, 51 A.D.2d 97, 98, appeal dismissed 39 N.Y.2d 799). Finally, the plaintiff's cause of action to recover damages for fraud as against the defendant Frances Dragan was sufficiently pleaded so as to withstand a motion to dismiss (see, Lanzi v. Brooks, 54 A.D.2d 1057, affd 43 N.Y.2d 778). Lawrence, J.P., Kunzeman, Spatt and Sullivan, JJ., concur.