Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
By executing a written waiver of his right to a preliminary parole revocation hearing on February 22, 1984, the petitioner effectively waived his right to challenge the respondents' alleged failure to afford him a timely preliminary hearing as well as his right to relief in consequence of their failure to do so (see, People ex rel. Quinones v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 66 N.Y.2d 748; People ex rel. Miller v. Walters, 60 N.Y.2d 899; People ex rel. Romero v. Johnson, 122 A.D.2d 240; People ex rel. Linares v. Dalsheim, 107 A.D.2d 728; People ex rel. Hatterson v. Walters, 100 A.D.2d 978). Absent any indication that the petitioner's waiver was not made knowingly and intelligently, it must be deemed effective (Matter of White v. New York State Div. of Parole, 60 N.Y.2d 920, 922). Excluding periods of delay not chargeable to the respondents, a final revocation hearing was held within the 90-day period prescribed by the Executive Law (Executive Law § 259-i [f] [i]; 9 NYCRR 8005.17 [c] [3]). Accordingly, the proceeding was properly dismissed. Thompson, J.P., Niehoff, Weinstein and Eiber, JJ., concur.