Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
We find unpersuasive the defendant's contention that he was denied a fair trial as a result of the court's Sandoval ruling. The record demonstrates that the trial court engaged in a thorough balancing of the probative value and the prejudicial effect of an inquiry into the defendant's prior convictions (see, People v. Williams, 56 N.Y.2d 236). Moreover, while the defendant's prior offenses were theft related and were arguably similar to those charged in the present indictment, "questioning concerning other crimes is not automatically precluded simply because the crimes to be inquired about are similar to the crimes charged" (People v. Pavao, 59 N.Y.2d 282, 292; People v. Cherry, 106 A.D.2d 458). Hence, we discern no abuse of discretion in the court's Sandoval ruling (see, e.g., People v. Bennette, 56 N.Y.2d 142; People v. Scott, 118 A.D.2d 881).
Similarly unavailing is the defendant's contention that the issue of a prosecution witness's status as a possible accomplice should have been submitted to the jury. The record is barren of evidence from which the inference of the witness's participation in the crime could reasonably have been drawn (see, People v Santana, 82 A.D.2d 784, affd 55 N.Y.2d 673; People v. Byrd, 106 A.D.2d 511; see generally, People v. Basch, 36 N.Y.2d 154). Accordingly, the trial court properly refused to present the issue to the triers of fact. Brown, J.P., Lawrence, Eiber and Sullivan, JJ., concur.