Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, by reversing the conviction of assault in the second degree as charged in the ninth count of the indictment, vacating the sentence imposed thereon, and dismissing that count of the indictment; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant was charged and convicted, inter alia, of robbery in the second degree under Penal Law § 160.10 (2) (a), and assault in the second degree under Penal Law § 120.05 (6). Pursuant to CPL 1.20 (37), since it is impossible to commit robbery in the second degree under Penal Law § 160.10 (2) (a) without concomitantly committing, by the same conduct, assault in the second degree under Penal Law § 120.05 (6), the latter is a lesser included offense of the former (see, People v Glover, 57 N.Y.2d 61). We therefore conclude, and the People concede, that the defendant's conviction of assault in the second degree under the ninth count of the indictment must be reversed and that count dismissed.
We have examined the defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be either unpreserved for review or without merit. Thompson, J.P., Weinstein, Kunzeman and Harwood, JJ., concur.