Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's contention that the court should not have accepted his plea of guilty without further inquiry into possible defenses has not been preserved for appellate review (see, People v. Pellegrino, 60 N.Y.2d 636; People v. Greenridge, 129 A.D.2d 585), and is, in any event, without merit.
Furthermore, although New York's death penalty statute (Penal Law § 60.06) has been declared unconstitutional (People v Smith, 63 N.Y.2d 41, cert denied 469 U.S. 1227, reh denied 471 U.S. 1049; People v. Davis, 43 N.Y.2d 17, cert denied 435 U.S. 998, cert denied sub nom. New York v. James, 438 U.S. 914), the crime of murder in the first degree has not (People v. Silva, 69 N.Y.2d 858; see also, People v. Smith, supra, at 41). Thus, the judgment of conviction for murder in the first degree need not be vacated on that basis.
Finally, although CPL 220.10 (5) (e) prohibits a defendant from entering a plea of guilty to murder in the first degree under Penal Law § 125.27, that provision was enacted in 1974 as part of the legislative scheme to enact a mandatory death penalty (L 1974, ch 367; Bellacosa, Practice Commentary, McKinney's Cons Laws of N.Y., Book 11A, CPL 220.10, at 209). Since, as previously mentioned, the death penalty has been declared unconstitutional, the rationale behind CPL 220.10 (5) (e) is not applicable at the present time, nor was it applicable when this judgment was rendered. Therefore, the court did not err in accepting the defendant's plea of guilty to murder in the first degree. Thompson, J.P., Lawrence, Weinstein and Harwood, JJ., concur.