Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that he was deprived of his right to a speedy trial under CPL 30.30 (1) (a) was properly denied, without a hearing, based upon the undisputed facts set forth in the papers submitted in connection with this motion (see, People v Agosto, 123 A.D.2d 637, lv denied 69 N.Y.2d 708; People v Walters, 127 A.D.2d 870). That branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence based upon the alleged "unnecessary delay" in returning the search warrant and property seized to the court (see, CPL 690.50) was also properly denied. Assuming, arguendo, that the period which elapsed between the date the search warrant was executed and the date it was returned to the court constituted "unnecessary delay" within the meaning of CPL 690.50 (5), the requirement that the warrant be returned in a timely manner is a ministerial duty, noncompliance with which cannot be used to invalidate an otherwise valid warrant (see, People v Frange, 109 A.D.2d 802).
The sentence imposed upon the defendant was not excessive. Mangano, J.P., Thompson, Kunzeman and Sullivan, JJ., concur.