TOWNSEL v. CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, CAL

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Docket Number

No. 85-1777.

Attorney(S)

E.A. Dawley, Oakland, Cal., for plaintiff-appellant. Kevin T. Kerr and Vickie L. Dawes, Deputy County Counsel, Martinez, Cal., for defendants-appellees.

Judges

William Cameron Canby

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Donald E. Townsel filed a civil rights complaint on June 5, 1984, alleging violations of his due process rights and protection against unreasonable search and seizure. Specifically, he claimed the defendants took blood and saliva samples pursuant to an allegedly unconstitutional search warrant. Townsel failed to serve the summons and complaint on any defendants within the 120-day period required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(j). After the deadline passed, Townsel moved to enlarge the time for service, but the district court denied this motion and dismissed the complaint. The district court also ruled alternatively on sovereign immunity, prosecutorial immunity, failure to state a claim against the County, and collateral estoppel, but the dismissal was ultimately based on failure to timely serve. Townsel appealed the dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the district court abused its discretion in dismissing Townsel's complaint for failure to serve the defendants within the 120-day period prescribed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(j).
Whether ignorance of the service deadline by plaintiff's counsel constitutes "good cause" to excuse untimely service under Rule 4(j).
Whether dismissal for untimely service, when the statute of limitations has run, results in dismissal with prejudice.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

Townsel argued that his counsel’s unawareness of Rule 4(j) until after the 120-day period had expired constituted good cause for the delayed service.
He contended that dismissal was an abuse of discretion because the statute of limitations had run, effectively barring refiling and rendering dismissal with prejudice.

Appellees' Arguments

The defendants argued for dismissal based on Townsel’s failure to timely serve under Rule 4(j), emphasizing that ignorance of the rule does not constitute good cause.
They relied on sovereign immunity, prosecutorial immunity, failure to state a claim, and collateral estoppel as alternative grounds for dismissal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
United States ex rel. DeLoss v. Kenner General Contractors, Inc., 764 F.2d 707 (9th Cir. 1985)	Interpretation of Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(j) regarding dismissal for failure to serve within 120 days and good cause standard.	Supported the requirement that dismissal is mandatory absent good cause and that the good cause standard applies irrespective of who raises the issue.
Wei v. State of Hawaii, 763 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam)	Clarified that inadvertent failure by counsel to note the 120-day deadline does not constitute good cause under Rule 4(j).	Affirmed that ignorance of the rule by counsel cannot excuse untimely service; the court applied this reasoning directly to reject Townsel's claim of good cause.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the procedural requirement under Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(j) that a defendant must be served within 120 days of filing the complaint, or the action shall be dismissed unless good cause is shown. The court emphasized that the good cause standard applies regardless of who raises the issue. The court rejected Townsel's argument that his counsel's ignorance of Rule 4(j) constituted good cause, relying on precedent that such inadvertence does not excuse untimely service. The court further addressed Townsel's concern that dismissal would be effectively with prejudice due to the statute of limitations having run, noting that Congress balanced this risk against the need for diligent prosecution and mandated dismissal absent good cause. Because Townsel failed to serve within the prescribed period and did not demonstrate excusable neglect or good cause, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's dismissal. The court declined to reach alternative grounds for dismissal.

Holding and Implications

The court AFFIRMED the district court's dismissal of Townsel's complaint for failure to serve the defendants within the 120-day period under Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(j).

This decision directly resulted in dismissal without prejudice for failure to timely serve; however, because the statute of limitations had run, the dismissal effectively barred Townsel from refiling. The court did not create new precedent beyond reinforcing the strict application of Rule 4(j) and the rejection of ignorance of the rule as good cause. No broader legal implications beyond the immediate parties were discussed.

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DONALD E. TOWNSEL, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA, CALIFORNIA; WILLIAM A. O'MALLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF CONTRA COSTA, CALIFORNIA; RICHARD K. RAINEY, SHERIFF OF CONTRA COSTA, CALIFORNIA; JUDITH T. BROWN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF CONTRA COSTA CAROL MICHENER, JOHN PATTY, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

CANBY, Circuit Judge:

Donald E. Townsel filed his complaint in this civil rights action on June 5, 1984. In his complaint, Townsel alleged that the defendants violated his rights to due process and to freedom from unreasonable search and seizure by taking blood and saliva samples from him pursuant to an allegedly unconstitutional search warrant. Townsel made no attempt to serve his summons and complaint upon any of the defendants within the 120 day limit prescribed by Fed.R.Civ.P. Civ.P. 4(j).

On November 14, 1984, after the 120 day period had run, Townsel filed a motion to enlarge time for service under Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b)(2). The district court denied Townsel's motion and dismissed his complaint, ruling that Townsel had not shown that his failure to serve the defendants within 120 days after filing his complaint was the result of excusable neglect. The court also ruled in the alternative that (1) the State of California was immune from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity; (2) the defendant prosecuting attorneys were immune from damages liability; (3) Townsel failed to state a claim against defendant County of Contra Costa; and (4) Townsel was collaterally estopped from proceeding against the defendants.

We affirm the district court's dismissal of Townsel's complaint for failure to serve his summons and complaint within the 120 day period prescribed by Rule 4(j). We therefore do not reach the alternative grounds for the district court's ruling.

DISCUSSION:

Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(j) provides that an action against a defendant shall be dismissed without prejudice if that defendant is not served with a copy of the summons and complaint within 120 days after the filing of the complaint, unless the plaintiff can show good cause why service was not made within the 120 days period. "The good cause standard applies after 120 days has expired regardless whether the service issue is raised by a defendant on a motion to dismiss under Rule 4(j), is raised by the judge on his own initiative pursuant to that rule, or is raised by the plaintiff on a motion under Rule 6(b)(2)." United States ex rel. DeLoss v. Kenner General Contractors, Inc., 764 F.2d 707, 711 (9th Cir. 1985). We review a district court's dismissal of a complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(j) for abuse of discretion. Wei v. State of Hawaii, 763 F.2d 370, 371 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam).

In the present case, Townsel contends that he failed to serve the defendants in a timely fashion because his counsel was unaware of the existence of Rule 4(j) until after the 120 day period had run. We do not agree that Townsel's attorney's ignorance of Rule 4(j) constitutes good cause for untimely service. In Wei v. State of Hawaii, we affirmed the district court's ruling that the inadvertent failure of plaintiff's counsel to note the 120 day limit on his calendar did not constitute good cause for plaintiff's untimely service. We noted that Rule 4(j) "is intended to force parties and their attorneys to be diligent in prosecuting their causes of action," and we concluded that "[i]f we were to hold that Wei's attorney's inadvertent failure to calendar the Rule 4(j) deadline constitutes `good cause,' the good cause exception would swallow the rule." 763 F.2d at 372. We reach the same conclusion in the present case. To hold that complete ignorance of Rule 4(j) constitutes good cause for untimely service would allow the good cause exception to swallow the rule.

Townsel also argues that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the action because the statute of limitations had run and the dismissal for untimely service was therefore effectively with prejudice. We considered and rejected this argument in Wei, and we reach the same conclusion here. In enacting Rule 4(j) Congress balanced the possible loss of a litigant's federal cause of action against the need to encourage diligent prosecution of lawsuits. 763 F.2d at 372. "By providing that district courts `shall' dismiss a complaint served over 120 days after its filing unless . . . good cause for untimely service has been shown, Congress mandated dismissal in the circumstances of this case." Id. See also DeLoss, 764 F.2d at 710.

The trial court dismissed with prejudice on several other grounds. We need not reach those issues because dismissal under Rule 4(j) and the running of the statute of limitations is sufficient to dispose of the litigation.

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Townsel's motion for enlargement of time and in granting the defendants' motion to dismiss.

AFFIRMED.