NEWSOM v. NEWSOM

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Docket Number

44273.

Attorney(S)

Charles D. Read, Jr., for appellant. Richard M. Young, Scott B. Zolke, for appellee.

Judges

SMITH, Justice.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, William Newsom, Jr., filed a complaint seeking modification of alimony pursuant to OCGA § 19-6-19 (b). The appellee answered and requested attorney fees. After several months of active litigation, the appellant voluntarily dismissed his complaint on January 22, 1986, during the January–February term. Two months later, on March 31, 1986, during the March–April term, the appellee filed a motion for an award of attorney fees. The trial court awarded the appellee $5,000 in attorney fees without addressing the appellant’s argument that the motion was untimely. The appellant appealed this decision.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain the appellee’s motion for attorney fees filed after the term in which the case was dismissed.
Whether the appellee’s failure to file a motion for attorney fees within the term of dismissal precludes an award of such fees.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The trial court lacked authority to consider the appellee’s motion for attorney fees because it was filed after the January–February term in which the case was dismissed.
The motion filed during the March–April term was untimely and therefore invalid.

Appellee's Arguments

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Dover v. Dover, 205 Ga. 241 (53 S.E.2d 492) (1949)	A court has plenary control over its judgments, orders, and decrees during the term in which they are made and may revise, revoke, or modify them within that term.	The court relied on this principle to determine that the trial court’s authority to award attorney fees was limited to the term in which the dismissal occurred.
Moore v. McNair, 145 Ga. App. 888 (245 S.E.2d 25) (1978)	Upon appellees’ failure to object to appellant’s voluntary dismissal, the action, including counterclaims, is dismissed.	The court used this precedent to note that the appellee’s failure to timely act within the term of dismissal effectively ended the action and any claims related to it.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court emphasized that under Georgia law, a trial court retains plenary control over its judgments and orders only during the term in which they are entered. The appellant voluntarily dismissed his complaint during the January–February term, and the appellee had notice of this dismissal at that time. The appellee had an opportunity within that term to seek attorney fees but failed to do so. The court held that filing a motion for attorney fees after the term had ended—during the March–April term—was untimely and beyond the trial court’s jurisdiction. The court further noted that although no counterclaim was filed, the appellee’s prayer for attorney fees was part of the action that was dismissed, and thus, the appellee was required to act within the term of dismissal. Because the trial court did not address the timeliness objection and awarded fees regardless, the appellate court reversed the award.

Holding and Implications

Judgment reversed.

The court’s decision directly reverses the trial court’s award of attorney fees due to procedural untimeliness. The ruling clarifies that motions for attorney fees must be filed within the term in which the underlying action is dismissed to be considered. No new precedent was established beyond applying existing principles regarding a court’s plenary control during the term of judgment.

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NEWSOM v. NEWSOM.

SMITH, Justice.

The appellant, William Newsom, Jr., filed a complaint for modification of alimony pursuant to OCGA § 19-6-19 (b). The appellee filed an answer and a request for attorney fees. After what the trial court termed "many months of active litigation," the appellant voluntarily dismissed his complaint. The dismissal occurred on January 22, 1986, during the January-February term and two months later, on March 31, 1986, during the March-April term, the appellee filed a motion for an award of attorney fees. The appellant argued that the trial court could not entertain the motion as there was no motion filed within the January-February term and the filing during the March-April term was too late. The trial court, without addressing the appellant's out-of-term argument, awarded the appellee $5,000 in attorney fees. We reverse.

A court has plenary control over its judgments, orders, and decrees during the term in which they are made, and in the exercise of sound discretion, the court may revise, revoke, or modify them at the same term. Dover v. Dover, 205 Ga. 241 ( 53 S.E.2d 492) (1949). Furthermore, the courts of this state have held that "[u]pon appellees' failure to object to appellant's voluntary dismissal, . . . the `action,' including appellees' counterclaim, [is] dismissed." Moore v. McNair, 145 Ga. App. 888 ( 245 S.E.2d 25) (1978).

There was no counterclaim filed in this case, but there was an answer and a prayer for attorney fees. It is undisputed that the appellee had notice of the dismissal of the case during the January-February term, and had ample time within that term to seek a hearing on her prayer for attorney fees. It was incumbent upon the appellee to file her motion for attorney fees at the time the case was dismissed or, at the very latest, within the term in which the "action" was dismissed.

Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED JUNE 19, 1987 — RECONSIDERATION DENIED JULY 8, 1987.