EDWARDS v. HAMMOND

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Docket Number

86-57.

Attorney(S)

Mavanee R. Bear and Lee L. Hale, Mobile, for appellant. David F. Daniel of Brown, Hudgens, Richardson, Mobile, for appellee.

Judges

SHORES, Justice.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Emma Bell Edwards, employed as a sitter for Edith P. Whigham, sustained injuries when she slipped on a rug placed on a hardwood floor in Whigham's home. Edwards was a business invitee due to her employment, which involved substituting for a domestic worker, Georgia Lambert. On the day of the accident, Edwards was instructed to admit guests through the front door. Upon answering the door, she stepped on the rug, which slipped, causing her to fall into stacked chairs and tables that injured her hand. Edwards had not previously seen the rug as her work confined her to the back of the house. Lambert testified that the rug had never slipped before, was normally placed horizontally, and was in that position before the accident. Edwards was paid by Whigham's daughter. The case reached the Supreme Court of Alabama on appeal from the Circuit Court of Mobile County, where a directed verdict was entered in favor of the defendant, Warren L. Hammond, guardian ad litem for Edith P. Whigham.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the defendant, as the occupant of the premises, breached the duty owed to a business invitee by failing to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition or by failing to warn of a dangerous condition.
Whether the presence of a rug on a hardwood floor without rubber backing constitutes a dangerous condition sufficient to establish negligence.
Whether the plaintiff was contributorily negligent by failing to observe an obvious danger that she should have seen in the exercise of reasonable care.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The plaintiff contended that the rug’s placement on a hardwood floor without rubber backing was inherently unsafe and demonstrated that the defendant did not use reasonable care to maintain safe premises.

Appellee's Arguments

The defendant argued that there was no evidence of negligence or breach of duty, as the rug had never slipped before, was maintained in a safe condition, and that the plaintiff should have observed the rug and its condition through reasonable care.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Bates v. Peoples Savings Life Insurance Co. of Tuscaloosa, Inc., 475 So.2d 484 (Ala. 1985)	Establishing that a business invitee is owed a duty of reasonable care by the premises occupant.	Confirmed that Edwards was a business invitee because Whigham derived a material benefit from her services.
Lamson Sessions Bolt Co. v. McCarty, 234 Ala. 60, 173 So. 388 (1937)	Duty of premises occupant to keep premises safe or warn of dangers to invitees.	Applied to clarify the scope of duty owed and the necessity of warning of hidden dangers.
Quillen v. Quillen, 388 So.2d 985 (Ala. 1980)	Invitor’s liability depends on superior knowledge of danger; no liability for dangers known or observable by invitee.	Used to emphasize that the plaintiff must show the danger was unknown and unobservable by reasonable care.
Tice v. Tice, 361 So.2d 1051 (Ala. 1978)	Premises owner not insurer of invitee safety; plaintiff must prove defect and notice of defect by defendant.	Applied to require proof that the defendant had or should have had notice of the dangerous condition.
Geis v. Tennessee Coal, Iron R.R. Co., 143 Ala. 299, 39 So. 301	General rule on duty to warn invitees of dangers known to the invitor but unknown to the invitee.	Quoted to reinforce the principle that liability depends on warning of hidden dangers.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court recognized that Edwards was a business invitee entitled to reasonable care from the occupant. However, the Court held that the defendant did not breach this duty because there was no evidence of a dangerous condition unknown to the plaintiff. The rug’s placement without rubber backing was not deemed inherently unsafe, and the plaintiff had the opportunity to observe the rug’s condition but failed to do so. The Court emphasized the principle that an invitor’s liability rests on superior knowledge of a hidden danger. Since the danger was either known or should have been observed by Edwards exercising reasonable care, the defendant was not liable. The absence of evidence showing the defendant’s negligence or notice of a dangerous condition justified the directed verdict in favor of the defendant.

Holding and Implications

The Court AFFIRMED the directed verdict in favor of the defendant, Warren L. Hammond, guardian ad litem for Edith P. Whigham.

The direct effect of this decision is the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim due to lack of proof of defendant’s negligence or breach of duty. The Court did not establish new precedent but reaffirmed existing principles governing premises liability and the duty owed to business invitees.

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Emma Bell EDWARDS v. Warren L. HAMMOND, Jr., guardian ad litem for Edith P. Whigham.

SHORES, Justice.

Plaintiff Emma Bell Edwards appeals from a judgment entered on a directed verdict entered in favor of the defendant, Warren L. Hammond, as guardian ad litem for Edith P. Whigham. We affirm.

Emma Bell Edwards sustained injuries to her hand when she slipped and fell on a small rug placed on a hardwood floor in the home of Edith Whigham. It was stipulated by the parties at trial that, at the time of the accident, Edwards was a business invitee on the Whigham premises, due to her employment as a "sitter" for Ms. Whigham.

Ms. Whigham, the victim of a stroke, was unconscious on all three occasions when Edwards was hired to sit with her. It appears from the evidence that Edwards was employed on these occasions to substitute for Georgia Lambert, a domestic worker in the Whigham home, when Lambert was not available to sit with Ms. Whigham. In fact, Lambert was responsible for hiring Edwards to work on the day of the accident and on the two previous occasions. Edwards was paid by Ms. Whigham's daughter.

On September 8, 1984, Edwards came to sit with Ms. Whigham while the family and Lambert attended a wedding. Edwards was told that the bride and groom would be coming to the house that evening and that she should admit them through the front door. When she heard the front doorbell ring, Edwards proceeded into the front entrance hall to answer the door. She stepped on the rug in the hall, and the rug slipped from under her, and caused her to slide into a number of chairs and tables stacked in a corner. The chairs and tables fell onto Edwards's hand.

Edwards testified that her work had confined her to the back portion of the Whigham house, so that prior to the accident she had not seen the rug in the front entrance hall. According to Edwards, the rug was placed in a vertical position, running into the entrance hall. She testified that the Whigham residence was "well kept" and that there was no trash, debris, or water in the area of the accident, but, that in her opinion, rugs placed on hardwood floors without rubber backing are prone to slip.

Lambert testified that since she started to work for Ms. Whigham in 1981, she had neither seen nor heard of anyone slipping on the rug in question, or on any of the numerous identical rugs located throughout the house. She testified that she walks on the rugs daily and has never had one slip out from under her. Lambert also testified that when she first came to work for Ms. Whigham, the rug in question was placed in a horizontal position, and that the rug had remained in that position throughout her employment. She further added that she had never had the authority to move the rug or to change its position without permission from Ms. Whigham, and that the rug was in a horizontal position when she left the house for the wedding.

It is clear from the facts of this case that Edwards was a business invitee on Ms. Whigham's premises. Ms. Whigham derived a material benefit in having Edwards sit with her while she was recovering from her stroke. See Bates v. Peoples Savings Life Insurance Co. of Tuscaloosa, Inc., 475 So.2d 484 (Ala. 1985).

The occupant of premises has a duty to business invitees to use reasonable care and diligence to keep the premises in a safe condition; or, if his premises are in a dangerous condition, to give sufficient warning, so that, by the use of ordinary care, his invitees may avoid the danger. Lamson Sessions Bolt Co. v. McCarty, 234 Ala. 60, 173 So. 388 (1937).

Accordingly, an invitor is not liable for injuries to an invitee that are caused by a danger known to the invitee or by one that should have been observed by the invitee in the exercise of reasonable care. Quillen v. Quillen, 388 So.2d 985 (Ala. 1980). "The entire basis of an invitor's liability rests upon his superior knowledge of the danger which causes the invitee's injuries." Id. at 989.

The plaintiff contends that the fact that the rug was placed on a hardwood floor without rubber backing is sufficient to show that Ms. Whigham did not use reasonable care in keeping her premises safe. We disagree. In Quillen v. Quillen, supra, at 989, the Court announced the rule applicable to these facts as follows:

" 'This court is firmly committed to the proposition that the occupant of premises is bound to use reasonable care and diligence to keep the premises in a safe condition for the access of persons who come thereon by his invitation, express or implied, for the transaction of business, or for any other purpose beneficial to him; or, if his premises are in any respect dangerous, he must give visitors sufficient warning of the danger to enable them, by the use of ordinary care, to avoid it. Geis v. Tennessee Coal, Iron R.R. Co., 143 Ala. 299, 39 So. 301.

" 'This rule . . . includes (a) the duty to warn an invitee of danger, of which he knows, or ought to know, and of which the invitee is ignorant; and (b) the duty to use reasonable care to have the premises to which he is invited in a reasonably safe condition for such contemplated uses, and within the contemplated invitation. [Quoting Lamson Sessions Bolt Co. v. McCarty, 234 Ala. 60, 63, 173 So. 388, 391 (1937).]

" Therefore, as a general rule, an invitor will not be liable for injuries to an invitee resulting from a danger which was known to the invitee or should have been observed by the invitee in the exercise of reasonable care. As stated by the court in Lamson and Sessions Bolt Co., supra, at 284 Ala. 63, 173 So. 391:

" 'In 45 C.J. § 244, P. 837, the rule is thus stated: " The duty to keep premises safe for invitees applies only to defects or conditions which are in the nature of hidden dangers, traps, snares, pitfalls, and the like, in that they are not known to the invitee, and would not be observed by him in the exercise of reasonable care. The invitee assumes all normal and ordinary risks attendant upon the use of the premises, and the owner or occupant is under no duty to reconstruct or alter the premises so as to obviate known and obvious dangers, nor is he liable for injury to an invitee resulting from a danger which was obvious or should have been observed in the exercise of reasonable care.' "

Similarly, in Tice v. Tice, 361 So.2d 1051, 1052 (Ala. 1978), a case brought by a baby-sitter who fell on the employer/landowner's premises, the Court held:

"Assuming that she is an invitee, the duty owed to her by the defendants is the exercise of ordinary and reasonable care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition. The owner of a premises in such cases is not an insurer of the safety of his invitees, and the principle of res ipsa loquitur is not applicable. There is no presumption of negligence which arises from the mere fact of an injury to an invitee. . . . In the instant case, the plaintiff must prove, in order to recover, that her fall resulted from a defect or instrumentality located on the premises as a result of the defendants' negligence and of which the defendants had or should have had notice at the time of the accident." (Emphasis added.)

Because there is a complete absence of evidence tending to establish a breach of any duty owed the plaintiff by the defendant, the directed verdict was proper. Rule 50(e), A.R.Civ.P.

AFFIRMED.

JONES, ALMON, ADAMS and STEAGALL, JJ., concur.