Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
It is well established that the totality of the circumstances are to be considered in determining whether custody should be changed (see, Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d 167). A review of the record reveals that both parties are fit parents and love their daughter. However, the trial court's determination is to be accorded great deference on review and will not be disturbed in the absence of an abuse of discretion (see, LoBianco v LoBianco, 131 A.D.2d 642). The record in the instant case reveals no such abuse of discretion.
Significantly, the parties agreed that the respondent mother would have custody of the infant with liberal visitation rights to be afforded the petitioner. Absent extraordinary circumstances, an agreement as to which parent should have custody is a weighty factor (see, Eschbach v. Eschbach, supra, at 171). The determination not to transfer custody has a sound and substantial basis in the record and we, therefore, decline to disturb it (see, Eschbach v. Eschbach, supra; Eriksson v Eriksson, 128 A.D.2d 500).
Nor did the court err in refusing to submit the parties and the child to psychological examinations before rendering its decision. The record contains no evidence that the parties or child displayed emotional problems which would make the assistance of psychological experts necessary in order to determine whether to change custody (see, Opferbeck v Opferbeck, 57 A.D.2d 1074, lv denied 42 N.Y.2d 810).
Lastly, the court did not err by not interviewing the child. Interviews with the child are not mandatory, but may be conducted when doing so would be useful to the determination (see, Matter of Lincoln v. Lincoln, 24 N.Y.2d 270; Falkides v. Falkides, 40 A.D.2d 1074). In this case, an interview with the child would not have served a useful purpose (see, Falkides v. Falkides, supra). Mollen, P.J., Brown, Weinstein and Rubin, JJ., concur.