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Docket Number

Docket No. 92801.

Attorney(S)

Romain, Donofrio, Kuck Egerer, P.C. (by David S. Robinson, Jr.), for plaintiff. Law Offices of Michael J. Brochert (by David S. Anderson), for Arcade Saloon, Inc., and Van Dyke Sports Center.

Judges

PER CURIAM.

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Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion: Locklear v Stinson, Docket No. 92801 (Mich. Ct. App. July 21, 1987)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from an incident on October 1, 1984, in and around defendants' bar. Plaintiffs allege that the decedent, Jerry Locklear, and defendant John Stinson were business invitees of the bar and that the two became involved in an altercation inside the bar. Employees of the bar, who allegedly had actual notice of the dispute, ejected Stinson from the bar but allowed him to remain in the parking lot to wait for the decedent. When the decedent left the bar the altercation allegedly continued; the decedent fled in his car while Stinson chased him in his vehicle. The decedent's car then collided with a third party on Van Dyke Avenue. After the collision, the confrontation between the decedent and Stinson allegedly resumed, during which the decedent allegedly stabbed Stinson, fled in his vehicle, and was involved in a fatal crash.

Procedurally, defendants moved for partial summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) on plaintiffs' premises-liability claim, arguing no duty was owed once the decedent left the bar premises. The circuit court denied the motion, reasoning that plaintiffs' viable claim was that defendants breached a duty while the decedent was on the premises by ejecting him into a dangerous situation in the parking lot. Defendants appealed by leave granted; the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's denial.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether a business invitor's duty to a business invitee extends beyond the invitor's premises to cover injuries occurring after the invitee has left the premises.
Whether the trial court properly denied defendants' motion for partial summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) on the ground that, as a matter of law, no duty was owed once the decedent left the premises.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants' Arguments

Defendants moved for partial summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) on the premise that no duty was owed to the decedent as a business invitee at the time of the fatal accident because he had left the bar's premises.

Plaintiffs' Arguments

Plaintiffs argued that defendants' breach of duty on the premises caused the decedent's death away from the premises and sought to extend the invitor's duty beyond the premises.
In Count II of the complaint plaintiffs alleged specific breaches: failing to provide adequate staff to police premises and parking lot; failing to prevent Stinson from waiting in the parking lot; failing to remove Stinson after his conduct became obstreperous and aggressive; and ejecting the decedent without first ascertaining that Stinson had left the area.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Bolton v Jones, 156 Mich. App. 642, 647-648	Standard of review for MCR 2.116(C)(8): accept as true all well-pled facts and determine if the claim is legally unenforceable.	The court invoked this standard in reviewing the trial court's denial of the C(8) motion.
Moning v Alfono, 400 Mich. 425, 437	Elements of a prima facie negligence claim (duty, breach, causation, damages).	The court cited Moning to frame the negligence analysis and to identify "duty" as the primary element at issue.
Hetterle v Chido, 155 Mich. App. 582, 587	Definition of "duty" as an obligation recognized by law to conform to a standard of conduct toward another.	The court used this definition to analyze whether defendants owed a legal obligation to the decedent under the circumstances.
Meyers v Robb, 82 Mich. App. 549, 553	Whether a duty exists requires examination of the reasonableness of the risk created by the defendant's conduct.	The court cited this principle when discussing how to determine the existence of a duty.
Sponkowski v Ingham Co Rd Comm, 152 Mich. App. 123, 127	The question whether a duty exists is one of law for the court to decide.	The court relied on this authority in treating the existence of duty as a legal question appropriate for resolution on a C(8) motion.
New Hampshire Ins Group v Labombard, 155 Mich. App. 369, 371	Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) is proper if, as a matter of law, defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff.	The court applied this principle to conclude that denial of the C(8) motion was erroneous if no duty existed as a matter of law.
Askew v Perry, 131 Mich. App. 276, 278-279	Business invitor owes a duty to invitees to maintain premises in a reasonably safe condition and to exercise due care to prevent situations it knows or should know might result in injury.	The court cited this rule as the baseline duty owed by the bar to its invitees while they remained on the premises.
Gorby v Yeomans, 4 Mich. App. 339, 343	Articulated specific rules of tavern keeper liability to protect patrons from injury by another (six enumerated circumstances when duty arises).	The court discussed Gorby and its six rules but distinguished Gorby because the plaintiff there was injured on the premises, whereas the decedent here was injured off the premises.
Swartz v Huffmaster Alarms Systems, Inc, 145 Mich. App. 431, 437	When a person leaves the premises owned or controlled by the defendant, the invitor's duty ends.	The court relied on Swartz to hold that defendants' duty ended when the decedent left the premises, supporting reversal of the denial of the C(8) motion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by stating the proper standard for reviewing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8): accept all well-pled facts as true and determine whether the claim is legally unenforceable (Bolton v Jones). It framed negligence as requiring duty, breach, causation, and damages (Moning v Alfono), and identified "duty" as the principal legal element in dispute, defined as an obligation recognized by law (Hetterle v Chido).

The court then recited the general duty a business invitor owes to invitees to keep premises reasonably safe (Askew v Perry) and summarized Gorby v Yeomans, which sets out six circumstances under which a tavern keeper's duty to protect patrons from injury by another arises. The court noted that Gorby involved injuries occurring on the premises.

Applying these principles, the court distinguished Gorby because the decedent here was injured off the defendants' premises. The court refused plaintiffs' request to extend the invitor's duty beyond the premises and relied on Swartz v Huffmaster Alarms Systems, Inc., which the court cited for the proposition that the invitor's duty ends when the invitee leaves property owned or controlled by the defendant. Because the question of whether a duty exists is one of law (Sponkowski), the court concluded as a matter of law that defendants owed no duty at the time and place of the fatal accident and that summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) should have been granted (New Hampshire Ins Group v Labombard).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's denial of defendants' motion for partial summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8).

Implications: The court held that the duty of a business invitor to a business invitee ended when the invitee left the premises owned or controlled by the invitor; consequently, defendants owed no duty to the decedent at the time of the off-premises fatal accident, and plaintiffs' premises-liability claim was legally insufficient on the pleadings. The opinion does not announce or rely upon a novel expansion of duty beyond existing authority and therefore did not establish a new rule extending a business invitor's duty to injuries occurring off the premises.

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LOCKLEAR v STINSON

PER CURIAM.

Defendants appeal by leave granted from the circuit court's order denying their motion for partial summary disposition as to plaintiffs' premises-liability claim, MCR 2.116(C)(8).

The basis for plaintiffs' complaint is an incident that occurred on October 1, 1984, in and around defendants' bar. Plaintiffs allege that the decedent, Jerry Locklear, and defendant John Stinson were business invitees of defendant bar and became involved in an altercation while inside the bar. Plaintiffs allege that employees of the bar, acting with actual notice of this dispute, ejected Stinson from the bar but allowed him to wait in the parking lot for the decedent.

When the decedent left the bar, he and Stinson allegedly continued the altercation, after which the decedent fled in his car with Stinson chasing him in his own vehicle.

The decedent's car collided with that of a third party on Van Dyke Avenue. Stinson stopped at the scene and the confrontation between the two men allegedly resumed, whereupon the decedent allegedly stabbed Stinson with a knife, fled in his vehicle, and became involved in a fatal crash.

Defendants' summary disposition motion was based on the premise that no duty was owed to the decedent as a business invitee since he had left the bar's premises when the fatal accident occurred.

The trial judge denied the motion, ruling that the claim he recognized as viable was the alleged breach of duty owed to the decedent while he was on the premises, that being his ejection from the bar into a dangerous situation in the parking lot about which defendants knew or should have known. We reverse.

In reviewing a grant of summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, this Court is obligated to accept as true all well-pled facts and to determine whether plaintiffs' claim, on the pleadings, is so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development can possibly justify a right to recovery. The motion tests the genuineness of a claim or defense by challenging the legal, not factual, adequacy of the pleadings. Bolton v Jones, 156 Mich. App. 642, 647-648; 401 N.W.2d 894 (1986).

A prima facie case of negligence requires proof of four elements: (1) a duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant; (2) breach of duty; (3) causation; and (4) damages. Moning v Alfono, 400 Mich. 425, 437; 254 N.W.2d 759 (1977), reh den 401 Mich. 951 (1977). The primary element with which we are concerned here, that of "duty," has been defined as an obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct towards another. Hetterle v Chido, 155 Mich. App. 582, 587; 400 N.W.2d 324 (1986). Whether the law will impose such an obligation depends upon the relationship between the actor and the injured person. Moning, supra, pp 438-439. Determining whether there exists a duty under a particular set of circumstances requires an examination of the reasonableness of the risk created by the defendant's conduct. Meyers v Robb, 82 Mich. App. 549, 553; 267 N.W.2d 450 (1978), lv den 403 Mich. 812 (1978).

The question whether a duty exists is one of law for the court's resolution. Sponkowski v Ingham Co Rd Comm, 152 Mich. App. 123, 127; 393 N.W.2d 579 (1986). In a negligence case, summary disposition is properly granted pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) if it is determined as a matter of law that defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff. New Hampshire Ins Group v Labombard, 155 Mich. App. 369, 371; 399 N.W.2d 527 (1986).

It is undisputed that the decedent was defendants' business invitee. A business invitor owes a duty to invitees to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition, exercising due care to prevent situations which it knows or should know might result in injury. Askew v Perry, 131 Mich. App. 276, 278-279; 345 N.W.2d 686 (1983).

In Gorby v Yeomans, 4 Mich. App. 339, 343; 144 N.W.2d 837 (1966), this Court articulated the duty of a bar to its customers when it adopted the following rules of liability:

The duty of a tavern keeper to protect a patron from injury by another arises only when one or more of the following circumstances exists: (1) a tavern keeper allowed a person on the premises who has a known propensity for fighting; (2) the tavern keeper allowed a person to remain on the premises whose conduct had become obstreperous and aggressive to such a degree the tavern keeper knew or ought to have known he endangered others; (3) the tavern keeper had been warned of danger from an obstreperous patron and failed to take suitable measures for the protection of others; (4) the tavern keeper failed to stop a fight as soon as possible after it started; (5) the tavern keeper failed to provide a staff adequate to police the premises; and (6) the tavern keeper tolerated disorderly conditions.

Unlike the decedent in the instant case, the plaintiff in Gorby, supra, was injured while on the premises of the bar. On the facts of that case, this Court affirmed a jury verdict in plaintiff's favor, finding that the jury could have found one or more of the foregoing duties, breach of which was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries.

In this case, however, the decedent was injured away from the premises. Plaintiffs would have us extend defendants' duty as a business invitor by alleging that a breach of duty on the premises was the cause of the decedent's death away from the premises.

Plaintiffs alleged in Count II of the complaint that defendants breached a duty owed to the decedent by:

a) Failing to provide a staff adequate to police the premises and parking lot;

b) Failing to prevent Defendant Stinson from waiting in the parking lot for Plaintiff's decedent;

c) Failing to remove Defendant Stinson from the parking lot after his conduct had become obstreperous and aggressive to such a degree that said Defendants knew, or should have known, that Defendant Stinson posed a danger to others;

d) Ejecting Plaintiff's decedent, without first asserting [sic] that Defendant Stinson had left the area.

We decline to do so; when the decedent left the premises and was no longer on the property owned or controlled by the defendants, the duty ended. Swartz v Huffmaster Alarms Systems, Inc, 145 Mich. App. 431, 437; 377 N.W.2d 393 (1985).

In this case, the trial judge erred by denying defendants' motion for partial summary disposition. Accordingly, the denial of defendants' motion is reversed.

Reversed.

LOCKLEAR v. STINSON