Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
A decision with respect to a recusal motion is generally a matter of personal conscience (People v. Smith, 63 N.Y.2d 41, 68, cert denied 469 U.S. 1227, reh denied 471 U.S. 1049; People v Harris, 117 A.D.2d 881, 882). The mere fact that the Judge who decided a pretrial Sandoval motion also presided at trial did not constitute an abuse of discretion. "[A]bsent a showing of prejudice, the Judge, by virtue of his learning and experience, is presumed to have considered only the competent evidence adduced at trial in reaching his verdict" (People v. Lombardi, 76 A.D.2d 891; accord, People v. McKinley, 124 A.D.2d 752). Moreover, the court's refusal to recuse itself after determining the inappropriateness of a proposed plea agreement does not deprive a defendant of a fair trial (see, People v. Smith, 108 A.D.2d 763). Under the circumstances, where the record demonstrates that the trial court presided in a fair and impartial manner and the defendant was in no way prejudiced, the Trial Judge did not abuse his discretion in failing to recuse himself.
The defendant's extensive criminal history clearly justified the sentence imposed. We decline to exercise our discretion to reduce the sentence in the interest of justice (see, People v Joseph, 110 A.D.2d 716; People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80). Thompson, J.P., Weinstein, Rubin and Harwood, JJ., concur.