Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
Under the circumstances, we find that the appellant was informed of the nature of the petitioner's claim within a reasonable time after the expiration of the 90-day period for serving a timely notice of claim and there is no basis in the record for concluding that the appellant will be substantially prejudiced by permitting the service of a late notice of claim (see, General Municipal Law § 50-e; Beatty v. County of Saratoga, 74 A.D.2d 662, appeal dismissed 53 N.Y.2d 939; Matter of Wemett v. County of Onondaga, 64 A.D.2d 1025). Moreover, the petitioner did offer a reasonable excuse for her delay in serving a timely notice of claim (see, Matter of Wemett v. County of Onondaga, supra; Matter of Edwards v. Town of Delaware, 115 A.D.2d 205). We note that "[a]t issue here is not the merit of [the petitioner's] claim, but whether [the Supreme Court] abused its discretion in granting permission to [serve] a late notice of claim. Since proof of the merit of [the petitioner's] claim is not a stated criterion for permission to [serve] a late notice under subdivision 5 of section 50-e, [the petitioner was] under no obligation to present a prima facie case on this motion" (Hamm v. Memorial Hosp., 99 A.D.2d 638, 639; see, Passalacqua v County of Onondaga, 94 A.D.2d 949). Mangano, J.P., Brown, Lawrence, Weinstein and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.