PEOPLE v. YARBROUGH

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Docket Number

No. 5-86-0680

Attorney(S)

Don Sheafor, State's Attorney, of Vandalia (Kenneth R. Boyle, Stephen E. Norris, and Raymond F. Buckley, Jr., all of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People. Donald E. Groshong, of Alton, for appellee.

Judges

Thomas M. Welch

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The State of Illinois charged defendant Darold Yarbrough with the offense of communicating with a juror, specifically alleging that he indirectly communicated with juror Doug Sitter regarding a case in which Sitter was summoned as a juror. The State initially filed an information and then an indictment using statutory language to allege the offense. Defendant filed motions including a motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that it was insufficient because it merely recited the statutory language without detailing the specific conduct. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, finding the indictment insufficiently specific. The State appealed this dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether an indictment alleging the offense of communicating with a juror is sufficient if it is couched solely in the language of the statute without describing the specific conduct alleged.

Arguments of the Parties

State's Arguments

The charge alleging the offense of communicating with a juror is sufficient if it uses the statutory language.
The indictment negates the defendant's presence at the courthouse, implying factual sufficiency.
The State seeks to condemn every act of communicating with a juror as criminal.

Defendant's Arguments

The indictment is insufficient because it merely recites the statutory language and fails to state a cause of action under existing law.
The indictment lacks factual allegations describing the specific illegal conduct, which prevents preparation of a defense.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
People v. Sherman, 110 Ill. App.3d 854 (1982)	Purpose of charging instrument is to inform accused of charges to prepare defense and bar further prosecution.	Reinforced that indictment must inform defendant of nature of charges to allow preparation of defense.
People v. Wisslead, 108 Ill.2d 389 (1985)	Indictment may incorporate statutory language if it describes conduct with reasonable certainty.	Found indictment insufficient because it did not describe conduct with reasonable certainty.
People v. Grieco, 44 Ill.2d 407 (1970)	Charges couched solely in statutory language are insufficient if statute defines crime only in general terms; specific conduct must be alleged.	Applied to hold indictment insufficient for failure to specify particular conduct.
People v. Green, 368 Ill. 242 (1938)	Certain crimes (e.g., reckless driving) cannot be charged solely in statutory language.	Supported principle that some offenses require specific factual allegations beyond statute.
People v. Isaacs, 37 Ill.2d 205 (1967)	Official misconduct charges require more than statutory language.	Illustrated necessity of factual detail in indictment.
People v. Oswald, 69 Ill. App.3d 524 (1979)	Disorderly conduct charges require specific allegations beyond statute.	Supported insufficiency of bare statutory language.
People v. Aud, 52 Ill.2d 368 (1972)	Indictment for perjury must set forth alleged false statement verbatim or in substance; otherwise insufficient.	Analogized to current case to hold indictment insufficient for failing to allege communication.
People v. Bradley, 128 Ill. App.3d 372 (1984)	Where statute specifies type of conduct prohibited, particular acts need not be alleged.	Distinguished from current case because statute here is general and requires more detail.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the sufficiency of the indictment under section 111-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which requires a charge to allege the nature and elements of the offense. The court emphasized that the indictment must inform the defendant adequately to prepare a defense and to bar future prosecution for the same conduct. Although an indictment may incorporate statutory language, this is only permissible if the statute defines the offense with sufficient particularity.

The court found that the statute defining the offense of communicating with a juror is phrased in general terms and thus requires the indictment to specify the particular illegal conduct alleged. The indictment here merely alleged that the defendant "indirectly" communicated with a juror without describing the substance of that communication or the specific conduct involved. This lack of detail prevents the defendant from preparing a defense, as the essential element of the offense is the communication itself with intent to influence the juror.

The court rejected the State's argument that every act of communication with a juror should be criminalized without specifying the communication. It held that the indictment must allege the specific communication and its intent to influence. The court also noted that requiring a bill of particulars to supply these essential elements would exceed the purpose of such a motion.

Relying on precedent, especially People v. Aud, the court reasoned that indictments lacking specific factual allegations of the prohibited conduct are insufficient. Therefore, the indictment was properly dismissed for failing to state an offense with the necessary particularity.

Holding and Implications

The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the indictment against Darold Yarbrough.

The direct effect of this decision is that indictments alleging the offense of communicating with a juror must include specific factual allegations describing the prohibited communication and intent to influence, rather than merely reciting statutory language. This ruling ensures that defendants receive adequate notice of charges to prepare a defense. The opinion does not establish new precedent beyond applying existing principles regarding indictment sufficiency.

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THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DAROLD YARBROUGH, Defendant-Appellee.

JUSTICE WELCH delivered the opinion of the court:

The State appeals from a dismissal of its indictment by the circuit court of Fayette County charging defendant Darold Yarbrough with the offense of communicating with a juror. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 32-4(a).) The State raises the issue of whether a charge alleging the offense of communicating with a juror is sufficient if it is couched in the language of the statute. This court affirms.

On January 24, 1986, the State filed an information charging defendant with the offense of communicating with jurors in that

"the said defendant without legal justification and with the intent to influence Doug Sitter, a juror, communicated indirectly with Doug Sitter regarding a case in which Doug Sitter was summoned as a juror."

On February 18, 1986, the State filed an indictment charging defendant with the same offense using the same language.

On April 1, 1986, the State filed a motion for discovery. Defendant filed his motion for discovery on September 2, 1986. The State filed its answer to defendant's discovery motion listing 12 witnesses and referring to various reports. On October 7, 1986, defendant filed his answer to the State's discovery motion.

On October 7, 1986, defendant filed a motion in limine, a motion for bill of particulars and a motion to dismiss. In defendant's motion to dismiss, he alleged that the indictment was insufficient because it was couched only in the language of the statute. After a hearing on the motions, the trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss and, in doing so, stated in part:

"I think because of the generality of the statutory language in this case itself that more is required than the state [ sic] has alleged to state an offense."

From this order, the State appeals.

The State argues that a charge alleging the offense of communicating with a juror is sufficient if couched in the language of the statute. Defendant argues that the indictment failed to state a cause of action under the existing law.

• 1 Section 111-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 provides that a charge shall allege the commission of an offense by setting forth the nature and elements thereof. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 111-3(a)(3).) In determining the sufficiency of an indictment, this court must keep in mind the purpose of the charging instrument, which is to inform the accused of the nature of the charges against him so as to enable him to prepare his defense and to allow any subsequent judgment flowing therefrom to be used as a bar to further prosecution for the same conduct. ( People v. Sherman (1982), 110 Ill. App.3d 854, 857, 441 N.E.2d 896, 899.) In addition, the indictment may incorporate the statutory language of the charge so long as it describes with reasonable certainty the type of conduct alleged. ( People v. Wisslead (1985), 108 Ill.2d 389, 394, 484 N.E.2d 1081, 1083.) In this case, this court finds that the indictment was insufficient to inform defendant of the nature of the charges against him.

• 2, 3 It is well established that a charge couched in the language of the statute is insufficient, if the statute only defines the crime in general terms. ( People v. Grieco (1970), 44 Ill.2d 407, 410, 255 N.E.2d 897, 899, cert. denied (1970), 400 U.S. 825, 27 L.Ed.2d 54, 91 S.Ct. 49.) Certain crimes cannot be charged solely in the language of the statute: reckless driving, People v. Green (1938), 368 Ill. 242, 13 N.E.2d 278; official misconduct, People v. Isaacs (1967), 37 Ill.2d 205, 226 N.E.2d 38; disorderly conduct, People v. Oswald (1979), 69 Ill. App.3d 524, 387 N.E.2d 886; perjury, People v. Aud (1972), 52 Ill.2d 368, 288 N.E.2d 453. On the other hand, where the statute defining an offense specifies the type of conduct prohibited, the particular act need not be alleged. See, e.g., People v. Grieco (1970), 44 Ill.2d 407, 255 N.E.2d 897 (battery); People v. Bradley (1984), 128 Ill. App.3d 372, 470 N.E.2d 1121 (indecent liberties with a child).

• 4 In this case, the charge of communicating indirectly with a juror cannot be charged solely in the language of the statute. The indictment lacks a description of the specific illegal conduct. As the indictment stands, defendant cannot prepare a defense, especially since the indictment stated that he "indirectly" communicated with a juror.

At the hearing, defense counsel stated that defendant was not at the courthouse that day. The State acknowledged the argument but stated that the indictment as it read negated defendant's presence. Yet, the indictment did not allege any facts. The substance of the offense of communicating with a jury is the communication itself. Without any factual allegations regarding the specific conduct prohibited, the defendant cannot prepare his defense. Allegations regarding the communication or the words which constitute the offense are essential elements of the offense. Thus, an indictment couched in the language of the statute for the offense of communicating with a juror is insufficient.

This case is similar to People v. Aud (1972), 52 Ill.2d 368, 288 N.E.2d 453. In Aud the court held that an indictment for perjury which did not set forth the alleged false statement, either verbatim or in substance, was insufficient. In this case, the indictment did not allege the communication and as such was insufficient.

In the State's argument, it seeks to condemn every act of communicating with a juror as criminal. However, this court finds the State's attempted differentiation between the act of communicating and the communication itself is without merit because the substance of the offense is the communication. That communication must involve an attempt to influence a juror. Defendant cannot be apprised of the exact nature of the offense without the indictment's alleging the specific communication. If defendant wants any more details, such as the case in which Doug Sitter was a juror, he can move for a bill of particulars. In this case, a bill of particulars would have to supply the essential elements of the charge and such use of a bill of particulars is beyond its purpose. See People v. Aud (1972), 52 Ill.2d 368, 370, 288 N.E.2d 453, 454.

For the foregoing reasons, the order of the circuit court of Fayette County is affirmed.

Affirmed.

KARNS, P.J., and HARRISON, J., concur.