MEMORANDUM.
The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.
Defendant appeals his conviction after a jury trial of two counts of robbery in the first degree (Penal Law § 160.15, [4]) and one count of robbery in the second degree (Penal Law § 160.10), claiming the trial court erred in denying his request for a charge of criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree (Penal Law former § 165.40 [now § 165.50]) as a lesser included offense of robbery. Criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree requires the possession, or the exercise of dominion or control, over tangible property (Penal Law § 10.00); the definitions of robbery in the first and second degrees are not so limited. Because the "theoretical impossibility" test in the definition of a lesser included offense cannot be met, the trial court properly refused defendant's request (People v Glover, 57 N.Y.2d 61; see, People v Wheeler, 67 N.Y.2d 960). There is, therefore, no need to consider whether a reasonable view of the evidence would support a finding that the defendant committed criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree but not robbery in the first or second degree (see, CPL 300.50; People v Glover, 57 N.Y.2d 61, 63, supra).
Chief Judge WACHTLER and Judges SIMONS, KAYE, ALEXANDER, TITONE, HANCOCK, JR., and BELLACOSA concur.
Order affirmed in a memorandum.