STRAUSS v. CILEK

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Docket Number

No. 87-57.

Attorney(S)

Joseph G. Bertogli, Des Moines, for plaintiff-appellee. Edward M. Blando and David L. Baker of Elderkin, Pirnie, von Lackum Elderkin, Cedar Rapids, for defendant-appellant.

Judges

Rosemary Sackett

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The sole issue on interlocutory appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from defendant's romantic and sexual relationship with plaintiff's wife. The affair lasted one year and was secret until after it ended. Plaintiff did not learn of the affair until after it was over; plaintiff and his wife were in the process of obtaining a divorce when plaintiff initiated the action for actual and punitive damages. The trial court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment; the defendant appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress based on defendant's romantic and sexual relationship with plaintiff's wife.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff-Appellee's Arguments

Plaintiff contends defendant's conduct was outrageous in part because plaintiff and defendant had known each other since elementary school and were good friends.

Defendant-Appellant's Arguments

Defendant moved for summary judgment contending there was no genuine issue of material fact and that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Van Meter v. Van Meter, 328 N.W.2d 497, 498 (Iowa 1983)	That the issue whether an IIED claim arising out of a failed marital relationship can be resolved on summary judgment.	Invoked to state the IIED question in this context may be appropriately resolved on summary judgment.
Adam v. Mt. Pleasant Bank Trust Co., 355 N.W.2d 868, 872 (Iowa 1984)	Standard of review on appeal from summary judgment: the appellate task is to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the law was correctly applied.	Used to frame the scope of appellate review in this interlocutory appeal.
Amsden v. Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co., 203 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Iowa 1972)	The elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.	The court listed and applied these elements (outrageous conduct; intent or reckless disregard; severe emotional distress; causation).
Roalson v. Chaney, 334 N.W.2d 754, 756 (Iowa 1983)	It is for the court to determine in the first instance whether conduct may reasonably be regarded as outrageous; example where conduct was held not outrageous.	Relied upon to justify deciding the outrageousness issue as a matter of law and to analogize facts where no jury could find outrageous conduct.
Vinson v. Linn-Mar Community School Dist., 360 N.W.2d 108, 118 (Iowa 1984)	Definition of "outrageous": conduct so extreme as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.	Applied as the governing standard for assessing whether defendant's conduct met the threshold of outrageousness.
Kunau v. Pillers, Pillers Pillers, 404 N.W.2d 573, 576 (Iowa App. 1987)	Example where a lengthy sexual and romantic affair (wife with her dentist) could not support a conclusion of outrageous conduct.	Used as an analogous precedent supporting the conclusion that the facts here do not constitute outrageous conduct.
Fundermann v. Mickelson, 304 N.W.2d 790, 794 (Iowa 1981)	Statement that the court does not condone promiscuous sexual conduct.	Noted by the court to acknowledge disapproval of promiscuous conduct while distinguishing that such disapproval does not equate to legally outrageous conduct here.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by stating the summary judgment standard and the appellate scope of review. It set forth the four Amsden elements of IIED and determined the threshold question was whether defendant's conduct could reasonably be regarded as outrageous. The court concluded the summary judgment record failed to create a genuine issue of material fact on the outrageous conduct element.

In support, the court relied on precedent holding that courts decide outrageousness as a matter of law and on analogous cases where similar conduct (seeking the spouse of a married person; a wife's lengthy affair with another) was held not outrageous. The court recited the relevant facts in the record: the relationship was secret until after it ended; defendant's letters to the wife showed his intention to leave his family and form a permanent relationship; plaintiff discovered those letters only after knowing the affair had occurred; the wife had been unhappy in her marriage and previously engaged in a five-year extramarital affair with another friend of plaintiff. The court stated that, although it did not condone promiscuous conduct, the conduct here was not "atrocious and utterly intolerable" or beyond all possible bounds of decency and that an average member of the community would not exclaim "Outrageous!" upon hearing the facts. Based on this analysis, the court found the trial court erred in denying summary judgment.

Holding and Implications

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS: the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded with directions to enter an order granting defendant's motion for summary judgment.

Direct effect: entry of summary judgment for the defendant disposing of plaintiff's IIED claim in this case. The opinion applies existing precedents and does not announce a new legal rule beyond those applications.

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Richard L. STRAUSS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Thomas CILEK, Defendant-Appellant.

SACKETT, Judge.

The sole issue in this interlocutory appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from defendant's romantic and sexual relationship with plaintiff's wife.

Defendant's affair with plaintiff's wife lasted one year. Plaintiff did not learn about the affair until after it was over. Plaintiff and his wife were in the process of obtaining a divorce at the time plaintiff initiated the present action for actual and punitive damages. The issue whether plaintiff in this case can maintain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress that arises out of a failed marital relationship may be appropriately resolved upon presentation of evidence through summary judgment. Van Meter v. Van Meter, 328 N.W.2d 497, 498 (Iowa 1983).

Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Iowa R. Civ. P. 237(c). The resisting party must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Iowa R. Civ. P. 237(e). Our task on appeal is to determine only whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the law was correctly applied. Adam v. Mt. Pleasant Bank Trust Co., 355 N.W.2d 868, 872 (Iowa 1984).

The elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are as follows:

(1) Outrageous conduct by the defendant;

(2) The defendant's intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress;

(3) The plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and

(4) Actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct.

Amsden v. Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co., 203 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Iowa 1972).

In overruling defendant's motion for summary judgment, the trial court declined to rule as a matter of law that defendant's actions were not outrageous. We find the evidence in the summary judgment record insufficient to demonstrate a genuine issue of fact on the outrageous conduct element.

It is for the court to determine in the first instance whether the relevant conduct may reasonably be regarded as outrageous. Roalson v. Chaney, 334 N.W.2d 754, 756 (Iowa 1983). To be outrageous the conduct must be so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Vinson v. Linn-Mar Community School Dist., 360 N.W.2d 108, 118 (Iowa 1984) (citations omitted).

In Roalson v. Chaney, 334 N.W.2d at 755, Chaney asked Roalson's wife to marry him while she and Roalson were still married. The Iowa Supreme Court held no trier of fact could reasonably find Chaney's conduct outrageous. Id. at 757. More recently, in Kunau v. Pillers, Pillers Pillers, 404 N.W.2d 573, 576 (Iowa App. 1987), we held the facts of a case in which Kunau's wife had a lengthy sexual and romantic affair with her dentist could not support a conclusion the dentist's conduct was outrageous.

Plaintiff claims defendant's conduct in the present case is outrageous because plaintiff and defendant had known each other since elementary school and were good friends. We do not say that sexual relations between a plaintiff's friend and spouse would never give rise to a finding of outrageous conduct. We find the facts in this case, however, do not support a conclusion defendant's conduct is outrageous.

Defendant and plaintiff's wife kept their relationship secret until after it was over. Personal letters written by defendant to plaintiff's wife reveal defendant's genuine intention to leave his wife and children and to create a permanent relationship with plaintiff's wife. Plaintiff did not discover these letters discussing defendant's plans for the future until after he knew the affair had occurred. The record also reveals plaintiff's wife was unhappy in her marriage. She had previously engaged in an extramarital affair that lasted for five years with another of plaintiff's good friends.

We do not condone promiscuous sexual conduct. See Fundermann v. Mickelson, 304 N.W.2d 790, 794 (Iowa 1981). However, we do not find defendant's conduct in participating in a sexual relationship with a married woman, his friend's wife, who willingly continued the affair over an extended period, is atrocious and utterly intolerable conduct so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency. Vinson, 360 N.W.2d at 118. The parties are residents of Iowa City, a community of 50,000 and the home of the University of Iowa. A recitation of the facts of this case to an average member of the community would not lead him to exclaim, "Outrageous!" See Roalson, 334 N.W.2d at 756.

The trial court erred in overruling defendant's motion for summary judgment. We reverse and remand the case for entry of an order granting defendant's motion for summary judgment.

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.