Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's first confession, made at approximately 1:30 A.M. on January 4, 1983, was preceded by a knowing and intelligent waiver of his constitutional right to remain silent, and of his other Miranda rights (see, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436). The defendant again waived his Miranda rights prior to a second confession, made at approximately 2:00 A.M., and yet again prior to a videotaped confession made at approximately 5:00 A.M.
We also find without merit, the defendant's claim that his confessions were extracted under duress. Nor are we persuaded of the truthfulness of the testimony given at the hearing to the effect that the defendant had requested to speak with his mother or that his mother had requested to speak to him. But even assuming that such a request had been made, and refused, the defendant's confessions would not be subject to suppression on that basis alone (see, People v. Fuschino, 59 N.Y.2d 91, 100; People v. Casassa, 49 N.Y.2d 668, 681; People v. Calcaterra, 127 A.D.2d 778, 779). "There is no requirement that police officers permit family members of a competent adult in custody to communicate with him" (People v. Casiano, 123 A.D.2d 712, 713, citing People v. Crimmins, 64 N.Y.2d 1072, 1073). Rather, any alleged isolation of the defendant from his mother would be but one factor among several to be considered in judging the voluntariness of the confessions (see, e.g., People v. Anderson, 42 N.Y.2d 35; People v. Butler, 112 A.D.2d 1006). Under all the circumstances revealed in the record, we find that the defendant's confessions were voluntary.
The defendant's remaining contention is without merit. Brown, J.P., Lawrence, Weinstein and Eiber, JJ., concur.