Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Docket Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Docket Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion: In re Douglas A. Nash, No. 86-401 (Vt. Dec. 11, 1987)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was convicted by a jury of attempted sexual assault. He appealed and this Court affirmed the conviction in State v. Nash, 144 Vt. 427, 479 A.2d 757 (1984). He sought post-conviction relief previously; the superior court denied relief and this Court affirmed in In re Nash, 146 Vt. 259, 499 A.2d 785 (1985). In the petitioner’s second post-conviction petition he raised two issues preserved at trial but not raised on direct appeal: (1) whether admission of a knife into evidence was erroneous as irrelevant, and (2) whether the trial court erred in refusing to charge simple assault as a lesser included offense of attempted sexual assault. The superior court addressed both claims on the merits and denied relief; this opinion affirms that denial.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether admission into evidence of a knife was erroneous because it was irrelevant to the charged offense.
  2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on simple assault as a lesser included offense of attempted sexual assault.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner-Appellant's Arguments

  • The knife was irrelevant because there was no evidence linking it to the alleged crime, so its admission was erroneous.
  • The trial court should have charged simple assault as a lesser included offense of attempted sexual assault.
  • Limitations on access to a law library by the Department of Corrections created extraordinary circumstances excusing failure to raise these issues on direct appeal.

Respondent-Appellee's Arguments

  • The State's theory at trial was that the victim was compelled to engage in a sexual act by threats/coercion placing her in fear of imminent harm; evidence concerning the knife tended to make that theory more probable.
  • The petitioner had experienced appellate counsel who deliberately chose not to pursue these issues on appeal and communicated that decision to the petitioner; thus no extraordinary circumstances excused failure to raise them on direct appeal.
  • Simple assault is not necessarily included within attempted sexual assault because attempted sexual assault can be committed by means that do not require the elements of simple assault.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Berard v. Moeykens, 132 Vt. 597, 326 A.2d 166 (1974) Post-conviction review is not a substitute for direct appeal. Reinforced the procedural bar against raising issues in post-conviction relief that were contested at trial but not raised on direct appeal.
In re Nash, 146 Vt. 259, 499 A.2d 785 (1985) Standards when post-conviction claims not raised on direct appeal (inadvertence, ineffective counsel, extraordinary circumstances). Applied the standard that the petitioner must demonstrate one of the exceptions to the procedural bar; used to preclude the present claims.
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) Inmates' fundamental right of access to the courts requires adequate law libraries or assistance from persons trained in law. Used to evaluate petitioner's claim that limited law library access constituted extraordinary circumstances; court concluded Vermont defenders provided adequate assistance.
State v. Jarrett, 143 Vt. 191, 465 A.2d 238 (1983) Application of the V.R.E. 403 balancing test is within trial court's discretion. Supported the conclusion that admission of the knife did not constitute an abuse of discretion under the V.R.E. 403 balancing test.
State v. Forbes, 147 Vt. 612, 523 A.2d 1232 (1987) V.R.Cr.P. 31(c) requirement that elements of a lesser offense must be necessarily included in the greater offense to warrant instruction. Applied to determine that simple assault was not necessarily included in attempted sexual assault and thus no instruction was required.
Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410 (1980) The lesser offense is included in the greater only if each element of the lesser is always a necessary element of the greater. Quoted for the "always a necessary element" standard when analyzing lesser-included-offense instruction requests.
State v. Nash, 144 Vt. 427, 479 A.2d 757 (1984) Prior appellate decision affirming the petitioner's conviction and describing the nature of attempted sexual assault under the statute. Referenced as the prior appeal and for the statutory interpretation that attempted sexual assault may be committed by various enumerated means.
State v. Bourn, 139 Vt. 14, 421 A.2d 1281 (1980) Placing another in fear of imminent harm is one means of committing sexual assault but is not always a necessary element. Supported the conclusion that simple assault elements are not always present in attempted sexual assault; thus simple assault is not a lesser included offense.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first applied the procedural rule that post-conviction review is not a substitute for direct appeal and will not entertain issues contested at trial but not raised on direct appeal unless the petitioner shows inadvertence, ineffective appellate counsel, or extraordinary circumstances. Citing In re Nash and Berard, the Court examined the petitioner's claim that limited law library access constituted extraordinary circumstances.

Relying on Bounds, the Court acknowledged the constitutional right of access to the courts but noted that provision of adequate assistance by correctional and appellate defenders is an acceptable alternative to full law libraries. The record showed the petitioner had experienced appellate counsel, discussed the two issues with counsel, and that counsel made a deliberate decision not to raise them on appeal and communicated that decision to the petitioner. The Court concluded these circumstances were not extraordinary and therefore the petitioner was procedurally precluded from raising the issues in post-conviction relief.

Despite the procedural bar, the Court reviewed the merits. On the knife evidence, the Court applied V.R.E. 401 and found the victim's awareness of the probable presence of the knife tended to make more probable that she was compelled to participate by fear of imminent harm, an essential element of the charged offense under 13 V.S.A. § 3252(1). Applying V.R.E. 403 and the discretionary balancing standard of State v. Jarrett, the Court found no abuse of the trial judge's discretion and that the probative value outweighed any claimed unfair prejudice.

On the lesser-included-offense claim, the Court applied V.R.Cr.P. 31(c) and the "always a necessary element" test expressed in Illinois v. Vitale and State v. Forbes. It noted that simple assault under 13 V.S.A. § 1023(a) requires an act or attempt to cause bodily injury or to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury, whereas attempted sexual assault may be committed by any of several enumerated means and does not necessarily include those elements. Citing State v. Bourn, the Court concluded simple assault is not necessarily included within attempted sexual assault and that the trial court properly refused the requested instruction.

Holding and Implications

Affirmed.

Holding: The superior court's denial of the petitioner's second post-conviction relief petition is affirmed. The petitioner is procedurally precluded from litigating the two issues because he failed to raise them on direct appeal and did not demonstrate inadvertence, ineffective appellate counsel, or extraordinary circumstances.

Implications: The direct effect is that the petitioner remains convicted and his post-conviction claims are denied. The Court resolved the contested evidentiary and jury-instruction issues against the petitioner on the merits; no broader change in precedent was announced beyond application of existing standards.

In re Douglas A. Nash

1. Criminal Law — Post-Conviction Relief — Issues not Raised on Direct Appeal

Where issues raised in petition for post-conviction relief were contested at trial and were not raised on direct appeal, they will not be addressed on post-conviction review unless it is demonstrated that failure to raise them on direct appeal was inadvertent, that appellate counsel was ineffective, or that extraordinary circumstances excused failure to raise issues on appeal.

2. Criminal Law — Post-Conviction Relief — Extraordinary Circumstances

Right of access to law library or adequate assistance from persons trained in law is fundamental constitutional right for inmates seeking access to courts; here, petitioner had limited access to legal materials and was provided with experienced and skilled appellate counsel; fact that counsel decided not to raise certain issues on direct appeal and did not communicate this decision to appellant did not create extraordinary circumstances excusing petitioner's failure to raise issues on direct appeal.

3. Evidence — Relevance — Proof of Element of Offense

Victim's awareness of probable presence of knife tended to make more likely fact that victim was being compelled to participate in sexual act by being placed in fear of imminent harm; this fact was essential element of offense as charged, 13 V.S.A. § 3252(1), and was of consequence to determination of action.

4. Criminal Law — Jury Instruction — Lesser Included Offense

To be entitled to jury instruction on lesser offense than that with which petitioner was charged, elements of lesser offense must necessarily be included within greater offense, V.R.Cr.P. 31(c); attempted sexual assault does not neccessarily require act or attempt to cause "bodily injury" or attempt to "put another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury," which is necessary element of simple assault; trial court was correct when it refused petitioner's request to charge simple assault as lesser included offense.

Mahady, J.

The petitioner was convicted of attempted sexual assault after trial by jury. He appealed that conviction, and this Court affirmed. State v. Nash, 144 Vt. 427, 479 A.2d 757 (1984). A petition for post-conviction relief was denied by the superior court, and that denial was affirmed. In re Nash, 146 Vt. 259, 499 A.2d 785 (1985).

In this, his second petition for post-conviction relief, the petitioner presents two issues which were preserved at trial but not raised on his direct appeal. They are: 1) whether the trial court erroneously allowed the introduction into evidence of a knife which petitioner claims was irrelevant, because there was no evidence linking the knife to the alleged crime; and 2) whether the trial court erroneously failed to charge simple assault as a lesser included offense of attempted sexual assault. The superior court addressed both claims on their merits and denied the petition. We conclude that post-conviction relief is not appropriate under the circumstances of this case and that the superior court correctly resolved the issues on their merits adversely to the petitioner. Accordingly, we affirm.

Post-conviction review is not a substitute for appeal. Berard v. Moeykens, 132 Vt. 597, 600, 326 A.2d 166, 168 (1974). Where the issues raised in a petition for post-conviction relief were contested at trial and were not raised on direct appeal, they will not be addressed on post-conviction review unless it is demonstrated that the failure to raise them on direct appeal was inadvertent, that appellate counsel was ineffective, or that extraordinary circumstances excused the failure to raise the issues on appeal. See In re Nash, 146 Vt. at 261-62, 499 A.2d at 786.

The petitioner claims that certain limitations placed upon his access to a law library by the Department of Corrections created extraordinary circumstances which excused his failure to raise the two issues on appeal.

"[T]he fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or [by providing] adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977). The provision of full-time staff attorneys, working as part of public defender offices, provides an adequate alternative to prison law libraries as a means of insuring adequate access to the courts. Id. at 830-31. Vermont's correctional and appellate defenders capably fulfill this function.

In the present case, the petitioner had limited access to legal materials. Moreover, he was provided with experienced and skilled appellate counsel. He discussed the two issues now presented with his appellate counsel, who made an informed and deliberate decision not to raise them on direct appeal. This decision was communicated to the petitioner. These circumstances are hardly extraordinary and do not excuse petitioner's failure to raise the issues on appeal. The petitioner is precluded from raising these issues in this post-conviction relief action.

Nevertheless, the superior court addressed and correctly resolved the issues raised by petitioner on their merits.

As to the first issue, the superior court determined that the admission of the knife was not erroneous. At trial, the State contended that the victim was compelled to engage in a sexual act because of threats and coercion which placed her in fear of imminent harm. She testified that she had seen the knife in its case on the petitioner's belt a few hours before the incident. Although the victim did not testify that she saw the knife during the incident, she did testify that the petitioner reached behind his back where she had previously seen the knife. According to her testimony, at that moment she thought, "this is it, he's going to take out the knife and this is when I'm dead." The petitioner testified that the knife was in the case on the night in question. The trial court admitted the knife into evidence over the petitioner's relevancy objection.

Relevant evidence is evidence which has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." V.R.E. 401. The victim's awareness of the probable presence of the knife tended to make more probable the fact that the victim was being compelled to participate in a sexual act by being placed in fear of imminent harm. That fact, an essential element of the offense as charged, 13 V.S.A. § 3252(1), was of consequence to the determination of the action. The knife was relevant.

Though relevant, the evidence must be excluded "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." V.R.E. 403. The application of this balancing test, State v. Jarrett, 143 Vt. 191, 193-94, 465 A.2d 238, 240 (1983), is a matter addressed to the discretion of the trial judge regularized and channelled by the factors set forth in the rule. 22 C. Wright and K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure § 5212, at 250-51 (1978). The trial judge considered the appropriate factors of relevance and unfair prejudice. No abuse of his regulated discretion appears. The probative value of the evidence is clear, and the unfairness of any claimed prejudice is not readily apparent.

The superior court also correctly determined that simple assault is not a lesser included offense of attempted sexual assault. At trial the petitioner requested the court to charge simple assault as a lesser included offense of attempted sexual assault. The trial court declined to do so, and the petitioner objected to this failure.

In order for a defendant to be entitled to a jury instruction on a lesser offense than that for which he is charged, the elements of the lesser offense must necessarily be included within the greater offense. V.R.Cr.P. 31(c). See State v. Forbes, 147 Vt. 612, 617-18, 523 A.2d 1232, 1235 (1987). The lesser offense is included in the greater only if each of its elements "is always a necessary element of" the greater offense. Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 419-20 (1980).

Simple assault under 13 V.S.A. § 1023(a) requires an act or an attempt to cause "bodily injury" or an attempt "to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury." Attempted sexual assault does not necessarily require such an act or attempt. Rather, attempted sexual assault is the offense of attempting to compel another person to participate in a sexual act by any of the means enumerated in the statute. State v. Nash, 144 Vt. at 433, 479 A.2d at 760. Placing another in fear of imminent harm is just one of those means; it is not always a necessary element. See State v. Bourn, 139 Vt. 14, 17-18, 421 A.2d 1281, 1283 (1980). The superior court was correct when it concluded that the trial court had properly refused petitioner's request to charge simple assault as a lesser included offense.

§ 3252. Sexual assault
A person who engages in a sexual act with another person and

(1) Compels the other person to participate in a sexual act:
(A) Without the consent of the other person; or
(B) By threatening or coercing the other person; or
(C) By placing the other person in fear that any person will be harmed imminently . . . .


This petitioner is not entitled to post-conviction review of these issues in any event. Even if he were entitled to review, the superior court correctly ruled adversely to his claims on their merits.

Affirmed.

Use AI to get other relevant cases.

Comments

IN RE NASH
(Dec 11, 1987)