Ordered that the judgments are affirmed.
We conclude that the hearing court properly refused to suppress the subject identification testimony. Initially, we note that the showup procedure conducted at the crime scene minutes after the commission of the robbery was permissible (see, People v Love, 57 N.Y.2d 1023; People v Brnja, 50 N.Y.2d 366; People v Soto, 87 A.D.2d 618). The confrontation between the defendants and the witness Feres at the precinct was not arranged by the police for the purpose of establishing the identity of the criminal actors, and hence his identification testimony based upon this viewing was not subject to exclusion (see, People v Logan, 25 N.Y.2d 184, cert denied 396 U.S. 1020, rearg dismissed 27 N.Y.2d 733, 737; People v Brown, 126 A.D.2d 657, lv denied 70 N.Y.2d 703; People v Medina, 111 A.D.2d 190). Finally, although we find that the precinct identification of the defendants by the witness Keating was unnecessarily suggestive, we nevertheless conclude, based upon her opportunity to view the defendant Simpkins during the crime, and the proximity in time from the robbery to the precinct showup, that her in-court identification of Simpkins possessed sufficient indicia of reliability to warrant its admission at trial.
We have examined the remainder of the defendants' claims, including those raised in the defendant McDonald's supplemental pro se brief, and find them to be either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Mangano, J.P., Bracken, Weinstein and Kooper, JJ., concur.