Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The record demonstrates that the fundamentals of accepting the guilty plea were observed, that the defendant acknowledged facts sufficient to establish the commission of the crime of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree and that his plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered (see, People v Harris, 61 N.Y.2d 9; People v Spain, 110 A.D.2d 724). The decision of whether to permit a defendant to withdraw a previously entered guilty plea rests within the sound discretion of the sentencing court (CPL 220.60; People v Stubbs, 110 A.D.2d 725, 727; People v Kelsch, 96 A.D.2d 677, 678). In the instant case, the court afforded the defendant a hearing on the issue of whether his plea had been the result of undue pressure and permitted the defendant's polygraph expert to testify. Significantly, the defendant's admission of guilt during the plea allocution had not been accompanied by any claim of innocence. Under the circumstances, the denial of the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea was not improper (see, People v Frederick, 45 N.Y.2d 520, 524-525). Mangano, J.P., Brown, Lawrence, Weinstein and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.