Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see, People v Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620) we find that it was legally sufficient to establish that the defendant, acting in concert with another, was guilty of robbery in the first degree. The complaining witness identified the defendant as a participant in the robbery and his testimony concerning the incident established that the defendant was not a mere bystander. Contrary to the defendant's contention, Penal Law § 160.15 (4) does not require the People to introduce into evidence the gun used in the robbery or to present evidence that it was loaded (see, People v Saez, 69 N.Y.2d 802; People v Baskerville, 60 N.Y.2d 374; People v Brown, 108 A.D.2d 922).
The credibility of the testimony of the complaining witness vis-a-vis that of the defense witnesses, was primarily a matter for resolution by the jury. Upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the evidence established the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15).
Finally, the record as a whole establishes that the defendant was provided meaningful representation (see, e.g., People v Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137; People v Vega, 126 A.D.2d 686, lv denied 69 N.Y.2d 887; People v Morris, 100 A.D.2d 630, affd 64 N.Y.2d 803). Thompson, J.P., Brown, Spatt and Sullivan, JJ., concur.