Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The record reveals that the Supreme Court denied Feld's motion for summary judgment after concluding that the substantive law of New York should be applied to this action. However, while the court properly relied upon the choice of law rules adopted by the Court of Appeals in Neumeier v Kuehner ( 31 N.Y.2d 121) and recently reiterated in Schultz v Boy Scouts ( 65 N.Y.2d 189), it failed to first determine whether the decedent was a New York domiciliary or an Illinois domiciliary and instead erroneously employed the plaintiff's personal domicile in its choice of law analysis (see generally, Menefee v Floyd Beasley Transp. Co., 106 A.D.2d 556, lv denied 64 N.Y.2d 612). The term domicile refers to "[t]he permanent residence of a person or the place to which he intends to return even though he may actually reside elsewhere" (Black's Law Dictionary 435 [5th ed 1979]). It is clear that the papers submitted by the parties on Feld's request for summary judgment created a sharp factual dispute concerning the decedent's true domicile; hence, the denial of summary judgment was appropriate. However, a determination of the choice of law issue must await the resolution of the domicile question.
In view of the foregoing, and in light of the limited evidence contained in the record, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in denying without prejudice to renewal Feld's request to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens (see generally, CPLR 327 [a]; Islamic Republic v Pahlavi, 62 N.Y.2d 474, cert denied 469 U.S. 1108; Belachew v Michael, 59 N.Y.2d 1004). Thompson, J.P., Brown, Spatt and Sullivan, JJ., concur.