Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see, People v Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621), we find that the trial testimony was legally sufficient for the jury to find the defendant guilty of the charges upon which he was convicted. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15). The conflicting testimony adduced at trial merely created a credibility issue which was resolved by the jury (see, People v Daniels, 134 A.D.2d 361; People v Shapiro, 117 A.D.2d 688, lv denied 67 N.Y.2d 950).
The defendant's contention that the showup identification was impermissibly suggestive is without merit. The identification at the scene, which took place only a short time after the incident, was the type of constitutionally appropriate prompt identification procedure that serves to enhance the reliability of identifications and the prompt release of innocent suspects (see, People v Brnja, 50 N.Y.2d 366; People v Hernandez, 127 A.D.2d 790, lv denied 70 N.Y.2d 648; People v Soto, 87 A.D.2d 618). In any event, the People proved by clear and convincing evidence that there was a reliable independent source for the complainant's identification of the defendant (see, Manson v Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98).
We have reviewed the remainder of the defendant's contentions and find that they are either without merit or unpreserved for appellate review. Lawrence, J.P., Kunzeman, Kooper and Spatt, JJ., concur.