Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
We find unpersuasive the defendant's contention that the trial court should have admitted into evidence, as declarations against penal interest, several gratuitous hearsay statements made by one of his codefendants during a plea allocution and in a subsequently written document, which statements were of an exculpatory nature with regard to the defendant. Initially, we note that those statements which the defendant sought to introduce did not constitute an integral part of his codefendant's plea allocution, nor was their content clearly opposed to the declarant's interest (see, e.g., People v Brensic, 70 N.Y.2d 9, 16; People v Maerling, 46 N.Y.2d 289, 298-299; People v Thompson, 129 A.D.2d 655; People v Nicholson, 108 A.D.2d 929). Moreover, the proffered statements were patently unreliable and were not supported by independent evidence of their trustworthiness so as to qualify as declarations against penal interest (see, e.g., People v Brensic, supra; People v Abdullah, 134 A.D.2d 503).
We further reject the defendant's claim that the court erred in failing to properly instruct the jurors concerning the evaluation of accomplice testimony. A review of the language employed by the court in its instructions amply demonstrates that the finders of fact were apprised of the requirement that accomplice testimony must be corroborated by independent, nonaccomplice evidence tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime (see, CPL 60.22).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see, People v Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find the evidence was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (CPL 470.15).
We have considered the defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Lawrence, J.P., Kunzeman, Kooper and Balletta, JJ., concur.