Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The showup procedure utilized here was not for purposes of identification but was "merely confirmatory" since the confidential informant knew the defendant prior to the commission of the offense and the police officer had ample opportunity to observe the defendant during the commission of the crime (see, People v Johnson, 124 A.D.2d 748, lv denied 69 N.Y.2d 713; People v Fleming, 109 A.D.2d 848, 849). Moreover, the dangers of misidentification are minimal where law enforcement officials, trained in making careful observations, view the defendant in a showup procedure for purposes of confirming that the correct person has been apprehended (see, (People v Morales, 37 N.Y.2d 262; People v Carolina, 112 A.D.2d 244, 245, lv denied 66 N.Y.2d 917).
In addition, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (CPL 470.15). Contrary to the defendant's contentions, the identification testimony of the two officers and the confidential informant was overwhelming. Whether the informant's identification testimony was credible and the weight it should be accorded was primarily for the court as the trier of fact to determine since it saw and heard the witness (see, People v Gaimari, 176 N.Y. 84, 94). The record amply supports the identification testimony of the informant and any issues of credibility were properly resolved in the People's favor (see, People v Carolina, supra, at 245; see, People v Garafolo, 44 A.D.2d 86, 88).
We have considered the defendant's remaining contentions, including his claim that the sentence was excessive, and find them to be without merit. Mollen, P.J., Kunzeman, Rubin and Balletta, JJ., concur.