Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The statements made by the defendant at the scene of the crime were made in response to investigative inquiries, and were not the result of custodial interrogation (see, People v. Bennett, 70 N.Y.2d 891; People v. Huffman, 41 N.Y.2d 29). As such, they were properly admitted into evidence even though they were made prior to the time the defendant was given her Miranda warnings (People v. Bennett, supra; People v. Huffman, supra). Similarly, the statements made by the defendant while she was on the way to police headquarters were properly deemed admissible even though no Miranda warnings were issued. Assuming, arguendo, that the defendant was in custody at that point, her Miranda rights were not violated because, rather than being the product of interrogation or its functional equivalent, her statements were made in response to the patrolman's admonition to remain silent until she was advised of her rights (see, People v. Ferro, 63 N.Y.2d 316, cert denied 472 U.S. 1007; People v. Bryant, 87 A.D.2d 873, affd 59 N.Y.2d 786, rearg dismissed 65 N.Y.2d 638).
The evidence adduced at trial, both direct and circumstantial, was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620). Furthermore, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15).
The remaining contention raised by the defendant has not been preserved for appellate review (see, People v. Martin, 50 N.Y.2d 1029; People v. Tutt, 38 N.Y.2d 1011), and is, in any event, without merit. Mollen, P.J., Kunzeman, Weinstein and Rubin, JJ., concur.